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Abstract - Dennett's Compatibilism Considered 
My basic concern in this thesis is to examine the details behind Dennett's attempt to 
reconcile the notions of mechanism and responsibility. In the main this involves an 
examination of how he tries to secure a compatibilism between mechanistic and intentional 
explanations by developing a systematised conception of intentional explanation. 
I begin by briefly discussing the various notions needed for understanding what is at stake 
in the area and where the orthodoxy on the matter lies. As such the first three sections of the 
work are not focussed on Dennett's work itself and playa stage-setting role for the deeper 
work to follow. These notions include the likes of the rationale behind attributing moral 
responsibility, agency and action, mechanism and mechanistic explanation, and intentional 
explanation. I suggest that the basic intuition regarding mechanism and responsibility is such 
that the two are seen to be incompatible with each other. The main reason for this lies in an 
intuition that mechanism undermines intentional explanation and so renders the notion of 
action largely empty. Action, I show, is at the heart of our attribution of responsibility and is 
dependent on intentional explanation. Having presented these issues, I turn to the details of 
Dennett's 'intentional systems theory'. 
I argue that Dennett attempts to avoid the intuition that mechanism is incompatible with 
responsibility by developing a specialised account of intentional explanation. Dennett calls 
it the intentional stance. r highlight the two important features of this intentional stance, 
namely rationality and intentionality. r show that Dennett's position on rationality and 
intentionality is such that it does allow him to secure an explanatory compatibilism between 
mechanism and his sort of intentional explanation. r argue, however, that his sort of 
intentional explanation does not fulfil our requirements for ascribing agency or moral 
responsibility. This is accomplished in part by developing alternative conceptions of the two 
notions. Out of this r develop a different sort of intentional stance, which r call the folk stance. 
r show finaIly that Dennett's compatibilist move is incapable of being applied to the folk 
stance from which we do in fact make attributions of responsibility, and so conclude that 
Dennett fails to make the case for reconciling mechanism and responsibility. 
.' 
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1.0 Introduction 
In Dennett's paper, Mechanism and Responsibility, he attempts to show that intentional 
explanations are compatible with mechanistic explanations and thus that mechanism and 
moral responsibility are also compatible. The basic idea involved is that moral responsibility 
is an ascription or a judgement that pertains strictly to the domain of action. Actions, of 
course, are instances of behaviour that are intentionally explained. So, if intentional 
explanation can be reconciled with mechanistic explanation then as long as we can provide 
an intentional explanation of a mechanistic system it can be said to act and thus be held 
morally responsible. Dennett accepts that we do not actually hold all such mechanistic 
systems responsible and even that we do not always consider them as agents of the moral 
community. When we do hold such systems responsible we have, according to Dennett, 
decided to consider the systems as being persons. The fact is, however, that as far as Dennett 
is concerned, many if not all systems that we consider to be persons and hold morally 
accountable may in fact be mechanistic in nature and he seeks to show that if this is the case 
the mechanistic nature of the systems does not impact on the issue of their being responsible. 
This position is typically called compatibilism. It is contrasted with what can be called 
incompatibilism or libertarianism. 
Libertarianism is basically the idea that people can only be held morally responsible for 
those things for which they are also causally responsible. In other words, we can only be held 
responsible for the things we actually do and not the things that happen to us or for which we 
are merely the instruments. Now obviously when we are faced with a mechanistic system such 
as a thermostat, for example, we cannot, on this account, say that it is causally responsible for 
what it does. Certain antecedent environmental events are causally responsible for its 
behaviour and so it could not be a candidate for moral responsibility. What this position 
suggests is that there is a deep incompatibility between the notions of moral responsibility and 
causal necessity. This incompatibility is sometimes called modal incompatibility! because it 
involves the idea that the logical modality of necessity is just completely incompatible with 
the freedom required for responsibility. To say the same thing in simpler terms, there is no 
point at which the two types of discourse can meet. Trying to make them do so would be the 
'The term is coined, I suspect, by Gary Watson. See his book Free Will, p. 12 for a 
discussion. 
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equivalent of committing a category error. I believe that this libertarian position is basically 
the intuitive position with regard to responsibility. When we say that someone or something 
is morally responsible we want to be saying that ultimately the buck must stop with that 
system. There is small satisfaction in the idea that we blame a system for what it does but do 
not really have to because there is a story we can tell which cites antecedent events beyond 
the control of the system as the causal features of the behaviour. In essence then, the intuitive 
perspective is one where we feel that we can only legitimately assign moral responsibility in 
cases where we have no choice but to explain the system's behaviour in terms of its being 
causally responsible for what it does. Explanations which render the system itself causally 
responsible are, obviously, intentional explanations. 
It is clear that to respond to the intuition that there is a modal incompatibility between the 
notions of mechanism and responsibility one has to begin by showing that as explanations, 
mechanistic and intentional accounts are not mutually exclusive. What has to be shown is that 
the two types of explanation are not competitors as such and can both be given equal credence 
even if applied to the same instance of behaviour. This is what Dennett seeks to do, and can 
be called an attempt to establish explanatory compatibilism. What is clear is that his position 
is vastly different from the intuitive position and thus deserves attention. He is advocating a 
shift in our normal approach and thinking on this matter and so deserves due consideration 
and scrutiny. I believe that Dennett is, in the final analysis, unsuccessful in achieving his aim. 
What I propose to do is to show why I believe this. Basically I investigate the details of both 
our intuitions and Dennett's account and show that, valuable as his account is, he fails to 
persuade us to abandon our intuitive position. 
Structurally the investigation takes the following form. I begin with a section which seeks 
to establish with clarity the notion that the ascription of moral responsibility requires at least 
being able to provide a purposive or intentional explanation of behaviour. I rely here on an 
intuitive or common sense understanding of both intentional explanation and the ascription 
of moral responsibility. In the next section I suggest, from an intuitive perspective again, that 
there is a strong sense in which intentional explanation might be thought to be undermined 
by the truth of mechanism. At this stage I present a comprehensive explanation of the notion 
of mechanism and mechanistic explanation. I then, in section four, suggest that maybe the 
intentional explanation of behaviour is not undermined by mechanism. This will take the form 
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of a presentation ofDennetl's compatibilism. In the following section I put some pressure on 
Dennett's position. In the main my concern is simply to cast doubt upon the legitimacy of his 
compatibilism. I focus primarily on the notion of rationality he exploits and suggest that it 
does not accord with either our intuitions or our requirements. Finally I show that Dennett' s 
intentional stance is better understood as a pseudo-intentional stance and that although it is 
successful as an option for a kind of explanatory compatibilism the resultant compatibilism 
is weak and fails to find a place for genuine moral responsibility in a mechanistic world. 
4 
2.0 The ascription of responsibility requires the adoption of the intentional stance 
I wish to begin by presenting what I take to be the intuitive or common sense orthodoxy 
regarding the ascription of responsibility. Basically I examine the conditions under which 
ordinary people would be inclined to ascribe praise or blame for a particular piece of 
behaviour and when they would be inclined to withdraw such ascriptions. Given that such 
people generally begin from a position where they do ascribe praise and blame for behaviour 
we might find that the conditions under which they retract their ascriptions are more 
instructive. 
The judgement of responsibility involves essentially two parties - the judge and the 
judged.2 These may be the same person as when I judge myself responsible for something that 
I did. Most of the time, however, at least two individuals are involved. When responsibility 
is at issue we are not concerned with the goodness or badness of behaviour. So it is not as if 
we judge people responsible for their bad actions and not their good ones or vice versa. Rather 
we judge on the basis of the circumstances of the behaviour. That is, we evaluate the choices 
open to the person and their reasons for behaving as they did. Making a judgement of causal 
responsibility stick requires a presupposition that the person is an agent. So we do not assign 
responsibility to most animals, mechanisms or micro-organisms. This is because we cannot 
generally make sense of their behaviour from a perspective which would imply that they are 
causally responsible for their behaviour. If we could understand their behaviour from an 
internal perspective such as to suggest that they are agents, that is that they are causally 
responsible for what they do, we might begin to assign responsibility. But as things stand we 
can only understand, and that generally in an impoverished sense, why they did what they did. 
We say that it was unfortunate or lucky but not despicable or admirable which would imply 
agency. From this discussion it is clear that one of the first things we need to address in trying 
to gain a clear understanding of the conditions under which we assign responsibility is the 
notion of agency. 
When we discover that a person behaved as they did without having any control over the 
behaviour at any stage we are inclined to withdraw any ascription of praise or blame. Thus, 
2This, and much of the rest of the paragraph, owes much to Thomas Nagel's 
"prephilosophical" discussion of responsibility on pp. 120-124 in The View from Nowhere. 
5 
suppose that Josephine suddenly smashes the priceless Ming vase she was holding and we 
discover that at that moment she was victim to an isolated but massive epileptic discharge 
which caused a complete yet temporary loss of motor coordination. Under these circumstances 
we would tend not to blame her in any but the most trivial sense. The trivial sense in which 
we would blame her is that in which we say that it was Josephine as opposed to another 
person in whose care the vase came to an end. Such blame is not moral blame and has no 
impact on the question of responsibility. The reason we would not blame Josephine in a 
stronger sense, such as the sense we would employ if instead of the epileptic discharge we 
discovered that the reason for the breaking of the vase lay in the fact that she coveted the vase, 
knew that she could never own it, and desired that no-one else have the pleasure, is that there 
is a strong sense in which she did not do anything. In fact Josephine had no way of knowing 
what was going to happen to her and so could not even have known not to handle the vase 
then. We say that with regard to that instance of behaviour that it was mere bodily movement 
as opposed to action, that in the breaking of the vase Josephine was no more an agent than the 
wind would have been if it had blown the vase over. 
The question posed by this example is one about the nature of agency. What conditions 
do we require to be fulfilled in order for ajustified ascription of agency? First we need to draw 
a distinction. Of any behaviour it is either an action or, shall we say, a mere bodily movement. 
That behaviour which is action is the product of an agent whereas that behaviour which is 
mere bodily movement is the product of some force beyond the control of the agent. 
Josephine's behaviour was mere bodily movement in this sense. Depending on what sort of 
explanation is true of behaviour we would term it action or bodily movement.3 So there is 
basically a single, and apparently simple, criterion for agency - that the individual acts. When 
the individual does not act, that is when we can explain her behaviour in a way that the reason 
for the behaviour lies beyond the control of the person, she is not an agent. While this rough 
and ready characterisation of agency is simple, its simplicity is its flaw for the question has 
3To avoid being accused of begging the question against compatibilism I would like to 
point out that on all accounts, libertarian and otherwise, if an intentional explanation of behaviour 
is not true then there is no action. So I am not building into my account any idea that behaviour 
that is mechanistically caused is strictly speaking not action. From the compatibilist perspective 
it is obvious that such behaviour does count as action if there is also an intentional description 
thereof. 
6 
been insufficiently answered and has merely been removed to a different level of analysis. 
Specifically it is now incumbent on us to determine what conditions must be fulfilled for 
action to have taken place. 
The common sense notion of action is unfortunately rather impoverished and so my 
treatment here probably takes the discussion somewhat beyond that of pre-reflective intuition. 
I suggested above that the question of agency and hence that of action is to be settled by the 
nature of the explanation of behaviour. In the breaking of the Ming vase I suggested two 
differing scenarios. In the first we saw Josephine breaking the vase because of an epileptic 
seizure. Although it would be ponderous to say, what we really saw, given the explanation, 
was Josephine's body breaking the vase. That is, we saw mere bodily movement. In the 
second scenario I postulated that we witnessed very similar looking behaviour only the reason 
for the behaviour was different. In this case I suggested that Josephine a) wanted the vase b) 
knew she could not have it c) desired that no-one else have the pleasure of owning it, and d) 
believed that by breaking the vase this desire would be realised. Short for spelling out the 
reasons for the behaviour in this way we would probably just say that Josephine broke the 
vase out of spite. Here we see action. 
Action occurs if there is a description of the behaviour under which the behaviour is 
intentional. Intentional descriptions or explanations are simply ones which show the behaviour 
to be a doing as opposed to a happening or in Nagel' s terminology an action as opposed to 
a phenomenon. On the first description of the breaking of the Ming vase we had a happening 
while on the second we had a dOing. Rendering a piece of behaviour into a doing involves 
explaining it using a particular purposive or goal related terminology. Words like intending, 
desiring, wanting, choosing, believing, suspecting, and assuming, among others, feature in this 
terminology. Basically intentional explanation of behaviour picks out the agent as a source of 
the reasons for the behaviour and describes those reasons in the language of intentionality. The 
question as to what we mean by the agent being the source of the reasons for the behaviour 
is answered in the notion of an agent having ends or goals. Given certain ends that the agent 
has and certain beliefs about how to achieve those ends we are given a rationale for the 
behaviour. Intentional explanations, in Davidson's terminology, rationalize behaviour. 
(Davidson, (1980) p. 3) Not all explanations containing intentional terms function in this way 
according to Dennett.(Dennett, (1978) p. 235) Some explanations cite intentional phenomena 
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as causes of behaviour yet fail to make the behaviour reasonable. Consider, my belief that the 
car would hit the pedestrian caused me to freeze. As it stands this has the appearance of an 
intentional explanation but is not one. The citing of my belief does not make my behaviour 
reasonable in this case, in fact the explanation is a purely causal one.4 On the other hand if we 
said that I yelled out a warning because of my belief that the car would hit the pedestrian then 
we would have an intentional explanation of my action. My belief in this case gives a rationale 
for my behaviour. 
The simplest and most widely used example of intentional explanation is where we say 
that the individual had a belief-desire pair which was the reason for the behaviour. So, for 
example, I desire to quench my thirst (my end) and I believe that drinking the water will 
quench it (the means) and so I drink the water. The explanation here is purposive. There is a 
particular end which I have, namely the quenching of my thirst, which I believe will be 
satisfied in a particular way, namely by drinking the water. This differs from the non-
purposive explanation of Josephine's breaking the Ming vase while having an epileptic 
seizure or my immobility at the potential accident. 
Of course things are not generally as easily characterised as I have presented them. 
Consider my drinking of the water but imagine it to be a poisonous mixture for killing aphids. 
Under one description I intentionally drink the mixture but under another I do not. Did I 
intentionally drink the liquid? Yes. Why? Because I thought it was water, and I desired to 
quench my thirst and believed that drinking water would do so. Did I intentionally drink the 
poison? Well, no. Explain? I desired to quench my thirst, believed that drinking water would 
do this for me and so initiated the action, but, if! had known that it was poison I wouldn't 
have because I have another belief that says that the cost of drinking poison far outweighs the 
satisfaction of my thirst. So I didn't intentionally drink the poison although I did intentionally 
drink the liquid that was poisonous.' When we have a case like this and we are trying to work 
4I am not intending to present a position here on the issue of whether intentional 
explanations are causal explanations or not. What the example seeks to show is that there is a 
clear difference between citing intentional states as causes of behaviour and intentional 
explanations which rationalise behaviour by citing such states. 
'This example is similar to Davidson's example of the action of turning on a light being 
(continued ... ) 
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out whether a person is blameworthy or not we look beyond the simple intentional explanation 
to the existence of what can only be called extenuating circumstances. Thus if! was present 
at the time in which the deadly concoction was prepared and was fully cognizant and was not 
otherwise engaged then it is implausible for me to claim that I thought it was water and so we 
might attribute blame to me for the action. 
Although it is sometimes the case that we do not attribute praise or blame, that is 
responsibility, for an action it is clear that when we do attribute responsibility it is only for 
actions. Which is to say that action is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the 
attribution of responsibility. We have seen that action occurs when we can successfully adopt 
an intentional explanation of the behaviour and so an intentional explanation is a necessary 
condition for responsibility. In no circumstance where there is not an intentional explanation 
of behaviour do we assign responsibility. 
The upshot of this discussion thus far goes something like this. The notion of moral 
responsibility depends on the idea that at least some behaviour evinced by a person is 
blameworthy in the sense that the person had some choice in the matter. Such behaviour is 
typically called intentional behaviour or action. The idea is that moral responsibility is 
attributable when the behaviour is intentional, that is whenever it involves a bodily movement 
coupled with a propositional attitude that plays a causal role, for example a motivational 
belief-desire pair. When there is merely a bodily movement, or even where there is a bodily 
movement coupled with the relevant propositional attitude but where the propositional attitude 
does not playa motivational, that is causal, role6, we resist talk of there having been an action 
5( ... continued) 
identical with alerting a prowler to one's presence. See Actions, Reasons, and Causes pp. 4 - 6. 
There Davidson shows that under the description of turning on the light the behaviour is an 
intentional action because it is rationalised by a desire to turn on the light and a belief that the 
movement in question would fulfil this. But under the description of alerting the prowler the 
behaviour is not an intentional action because the relevant beliefs and desires do not rationalise 
the behaviour. 
6This scenario is that of the Epiphenomenalist pOSItIOn on the mental. If an 
epiphenomenalist wishes to hold onto the notion of responsibility it carmot be in the form of our 
ordinary conception. This does not mean to say that such a move is impossible it is just beyond 
the scope of the present work to evaluate it. I am merely seeking to cast doubt on one particular 
(continued ... ) 
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and we do not assign responsibility to the person. A further condition that might be placed on 
the attribution of moral responsibility stems from the conviction that the propositional attitude 
must not only be motivational but must also not be caused by an antecedent physical chain.' 
This is just the idea that if we are going to assign blame for something we should lay it at the 
feet of the perpetrator. If the propositional attitudes involved in action are causally linked to 
an antecedent physical chain then the ascription of blame becomes a somewhat arbitrary affair. 
In fact it begins to look as though the ascription of moral responsibility is just a case of 
settling on a scapegoat. To preserve the non-arbitrariness of the ascription of moral 
responsibility we have to have a conception of action that does not allow for passing the buck. 
This conception is, I submit, that folk conception discussed above. 
\ .. continued) 
position, namely Dennett's. 
'Once again this might seem to beg the question against compatibilism. In fact it does and 
I am well aware of this. The fact is however, that I am not attempting to argue against, or for, any 
particular position here. I am not even presenting an argument. All that I am concerned to do at 
this stage is to draw out the details of our 'folk' intuitions on these matters. That these intuitions 
are unpalatable from a compatibilist stance is not something that I can really change. 
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3.0 Intentional Explanation apparently undermined by Mechanism 
In the previous section we saw that our intuitions regarding the ascription of responsibility 
are that we can only make a legitimate ascription if the behaviour in question is action. We 
also saw that action is characterised by our being able to use a true intentional explanation of 
the behaviour. S In this section I propose to show that a different type of explanation, namely 
mechanistic explanation, undermines intentional explanations. Once again I present the view 
from common sense. Where one type of explanation undermines another we have what is 
called explanatory incompatibilism. I wish to suggest that our intuitions tell us that with 
regard to mechanist versus intentional explanations such incompatibilism is true. If this is 
correct and it proves to be the case that mechanistic explanations are possible for behaviour 
that we previously used intentional language to explain then our ascriptions of responsibility 
are in trouble. The reasoning here is simple. If there is an intentional explanation of behaviour 
then it is action. If there is action then we can be held morally responsible. Mechanism 
undermines intentional explanations and so there is no action. Because there is no action there 
can be no ascription of responsibility. 
What are mechanism and mechanistic explanation? Simply stated mechanism is the idea 
that there is a causal chain of antecedent physical events leading up to any particular event. 
This differs from determinism in that the causal chain in question can be probabilistic in 
nature as opposed to the deterministic idea that the events which are causally linked are linked 
universally and without exception. So mechanism allows for the possibility of uncaused 
causes but they must be physical. The two basic features of mechanism are that it is event-
causal9 in nature and that antecedent physical events are always the causes. There are many 
SOnce again, from the compatibilist perspective this begs the question. Compatibilists 
obviously accept that we do not have to use intentional explanations of behaviour for it to be 
action. What is going on here is that the folk perspective on action and causation involves what 
we might call ' agent causation' which requires reasons to be the only causes of behaviour that 
is to be called action. For more on 'Agent Causation' see Sect 5.2, and Taylor, R Metaphysics , 
pp.5l - 53. 
9 'Event' causal as opposed to 'object' or 'agent' causal. Event causation is the standard 
conception of causation in physics. It could be contrasted with the notion of an object in itself 
being a cause. This is, at this stage, mysterious to me but I suggest the idea as a foil to my use of 
the term 'event-causal'. 
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cases of mechanism with which we are familiar. The obvious one is the case of the working 
of a mechanical object but chemical reactions, quantum mechanical events, and neurological 
events are all examples too. Mechanistic explanation is explanation that cites physical events 
as the causes of other events. So, for example, explaining why the car will not start by saying 
that its spark plugs are dirty and so no spark is igniting the fuel is a mechanistic explanation. 
We cite an antecedent physical event, namely the plugs' being dirty, to explain another 
physical event, namely the car' s failure to start. 1O 
With regard to the main thrust of this project we need to gain an understanding of what sort 
of mechanistic explanation could be used to explain human behaviour. We then need to 
ascertain whether or not it does undermine intentional explanation. The most convenient 
mechanism to use is probably that of neurophysiology. It is granted that at this point we do 
not have a very sophisticated neurophysiological theory but we must accept that at this point 
we do not have any very sophisticated mechanist theory about human behaviour. I am going 
to assume that we have such a theory so that we can see whether the explanations that it yields 
do undermine intentional explanations. The hypothesised theory is such that it is able to 
explain and predict all human behaviour except that which is caused by forces immediately 
external to the person." So instances of sneezing, hiccoughing, laughing, moving one's limbs, 
and twitching one's fmgers would all be explained by the theory. The method of explanation 
would be to show that various changes, both electrical and chemical, in the nervous matter of 
the body cause specific muscle flexion or extension which in tum are the movements 
described above. Any behaviour that occurs sans external force is assumed by the theory to 
originate in this marmer and is thus in principle explainable in this way. So we would have 
complete causal explanations for Josephine breaking the Ming vase, my drinking either the 
water or the aphid poison, and my yelling out at the scene of the potential accident. 
Furthermore the explanations would not mention anything like purposes, ends, or goals in 
their systematic breakdown of the behaviour. 
IOWhile the plugs' being dirty might not be considered an event in the strictest sense, it 
implies an event, namely spark failure. Basically I employ a very broad conception of what 
counts as an event here. States, processes, and standing conditions would all count. 
"This characterisation is basically the same as that suggested by Malcolm in "The 
Conceivability of Mechanism". 
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Dennett furnishes us with a useful example.12 He suggests that we suppose that a man is 
found who cannot, or will not, say the word "father". In all other respects he is perfectly 
normal and expresses surprise at his 'inability' to say 'the word I can' t say' . Dennett proposes 
that a psychoanalyst might offer a plausible explanation of this behaviour in terms of 
unconscious hatred and desires and beliefs the man has about his father. This explanation, it 
is assumed, makes the man's failure reasonable. In other words it rationalises the behaviour. 
Such an explanation would be a paradigm case of intentional or purposive explanation. But, 
we are to further imagine that a neurosurgeon arrives on the scene. He has at his fingertips the 
vast and complex theory envisaged above. This neurosurgeon establishes that there is a tiny 
lesion in the speech centre of the man' s brain caused by an aneurysm and that lesion is 
causally responsible for the man's language deficiency. It would seem, intuitively at least, that 
the intentional explanation has been undermined. A physical event in the brain was the cause 
and the event cannot be justifiably called the man' s reason for not saying the word. The 
mechanistic explanation renders the behaviour as a happening as opposed to a doing. 
Does a principle emerge from this example that mechanistic explanations undermine 
intentional explanations? On the face of it the example is one where the mechanistic 
explanation undermines the intentional one. It is very difficult to argue with science, 
particularly when science is in a position to point to the cause for the behaviour in a way that 
the non-scientific intentionalist cannot. But is there any reason to suppose that there is a 
general point to be made here that two different yet complete explanations of a single event 
cannot both be correct?13 There is nothing in the example that makes such a supposition 
obvious. Other examples may exist where we are quite happy with both explanations, or 
alternatively we might have an ontology that explicitly renders both explanations compatible. 
One case of an ontology that does this would be reductive materialism. The reductive 
12This example comes from the opening paragraph of Dennett' s "Mechanism and 
Responsibility" in Brainstorms. 
l3Por an interesting discussion on the possibility of ' explanatory exclusion' see Chapter 
13 of Jaegwon Kim's Supervenience and Mind. He argues that the notion of explanatory 
exclusion or incompatibilism is fundamentally right but does not base his position on a single 
example such as that which we have just examined. P or a similar defence of this notion see also 
Norman Malcolm's "The Conceivability of Mechanism". 
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materialist believes that mental items are directly reducible to brain states. So an explanation 
that picks out beliefs and desires as the reasons for behaviour is an explanation that picks out 
neurological states as the reasons for behaviour. Whether we opt for one or the other is up to 
us, but generally it will prove to be easier to use the intentional explanation because of its lack 
of complexity. I am not going to examine this compatibilist move further since it has no 
bearing on Dennett' s work. The fact is, however, that this position usefully demonstrates that 
there is not an obvious in principle reason to claim that mechanistic explanations undermine 
intentional explanations. The question we must ask in the face of this is whether it is indeed 
true that common sense tells us that mechanism does undermine the intentional. 
I think a different sort of example is instructive here. It is of a form that Dennett suggests 
is an intuition pump. 14 The example is that of the behaviour of a wasp called Sphex. Dennett 
cites from Wooldridge: 
When the time comes for egg laying the wasp Sphex builds a burrow for the purpose 
and seeks out a cricket which she stings in such a way as to paralyse but not kill it. She 
drags the cricket into the burrow, lays her eggs alongside, closes the burrow, then flies 
away, never to return. In due course, the eggs hatch and the wasp grubs feed off the 
paralysed cricket, which has not decayed, having been kept in the wasp equivalent of 
deep freeze. To the human mind, such an elaborately organised and seemingly 
purposeful routine conveys a convincing flavour of logic and thoughtfulness - until 
more details are examined. For example the wasp's routine is to bring the paralysed 
cricket to the burrow, leave it on the threshold, go inside to see that all is well, emerge, 
and then drag the cricket in. If, while the wasp is inside making her preliminary 
inspection the cricket is moved a few inches away, the wasp, on emerging from the 
burrow, will bring the cricket back to the threshold, but not inside, and will then repeat 
the preparatory procedure of entering the burrow to see that everything is all right. If 
again the cricket is removed a few inches while the wasp is inside, once again the 
wasp will move the cricket up to the threshold and re-enter the burrow for a final 
14An intuition pump is simply an example that is used by philosophers to pump the 
readers ' intuitions along the desired route. Dennett believes that we should be constantly aware 
of this possibility so as to prevent being sent on an emotional roller-coaster to a destination that 
we would not ordinarily accept. He is, of course, not adverse to exploiting them himself in times 
of need. See, however, Chapter 1 "Please Don't Feed The Bugbears" of Dennett' s book Elbow 
Room, for a discussion. 
check. The wasp never thinks of pulling the cricket straight in. On one occasion, this 
procedure was repeated forty times, always with the same result. 
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Sphex's behaviour is shown to be tropistic. That is, it is shown to be completely rigid 
within the parameters of the wasp's existence. On our first meeting with Sphex we are 
probably likely to patronisingly exclaim at her cleverness. We would even say that she acts, 
since there is a genuine intentional explanation of her behaviour. That is, there is an 
explanation of Sphex 's behaviour that exploits intentional terms and renders the behaviour 
reasonable. The explanation would be something like the idea that she knows that while she 
was away something could have taken up residence in her 'deep freeze' and so before storing 
her food there she checks to see that all is okay. This entails that she has certain beliefs about 
predators, desires for her off-spring and their food, and beliefs about how to secure those 
desires. Then the zoologist arrives and demonstrates the rigid mechanism of her behaviour. 
We rapidly, and with no fear of in coherency, retract our claim that she acts. We in fact say that 
it is only as if she acts, and that it is not that she really believes and desires but only behaves 
as if she had these intentional states. Furthermore we would say, unhesitatingly, that the 
intentional explanation is wrong. 
This example, far from pumping the intuitions, clearly demonstrates the fact that on an 
intuitive level we do not allow intentional explanations to co-exist with those of mechanism. 
The reason for this is once again not obviously an in principle reason. I want to suggest that 
in the majority of cases the reason is a chauvinistic one. We retract the intentional ascription 
because we do not want to entertain the possibility that we are 'waspish' in our behaviour. For 
us to entertain such a notion would, it appears, lead us to a position where there is no longer 
any meaning in what we do. In fact we would no longer really be doing anything - there would 
just be phenomena in the world. Basically the mechanistic explanation reveals to us that Sphex 
is not able to do otherwise, that she is completely at the mercy of hard-wired 'instincts' and 
it is a frightening thought that the same could be true of us. This would seem to be a very 
strong emotive reason for not accepting straight off a compatibilism between the two sorts of 
explanation. We embrace the explanatory incompatibilism and hold that our behaviour, at 
least that which we want to call action, is subject only to intentional explanation. 
In a way this reason is not at all a good reason for it begs the question against 
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compatibilism. Basically it starts from an assumption that mechanistic explanation cannot be 
true of meaningful behaviour. This issue is precisely one which a compatibilist would seek 
to deny. So if we are to proceed on this matter we have to find a logical reason for supposing 
that compatibilism is at least not obviously true. That is, we have to find a logical reason to 
assert that mechanistic explanation cannot be true of action. A classic exposition of such a 
reason is provided by Norman Malcolm in his essay "The Conceivability of Mechanism".l5 
Malcolm in effect suggests that our intuition that the intentional explanation of Sphex's 
behaviour is undermined by the mechanistic explanation is sound. He reasons that the theory 
exploited by the mechanistic explanation is one which provides sufficient causal reasons for 
behaviour. So everything done by Sphex (or a human for that matter) is completely accounted 
for by the theory. It follows from this, says Malcolm, that whatever intentions feature in the 
intentional explanation of the behaviour have nothing to do with the behaviour. The behaviour 
would have occurred as it did whether the intentions were present or not. When we take 
account of the causal completeness of mechanistic explanation then we see that there is no 
space left for causal explanation of behaviour in terms of intentional notions. Given that 
meaningful or purposive behaviour is that behaviour correctly explained by intentional talk 
and that mechanistic explanations render such talk superfluous there is more than a grain of 
truth to the cornmon sense assumption that mechanistic explanation cannot be simply true of 
action. 
The basic idea, then, behind our incompatibilist intuition can be summed up as follows. In 
our ordinary understanding of the notion of action it is the mental states and the logical 
connection between them that does the causal work in bringing the behaviour about. A 
mechanistic explanation essentially tells us that this has not happened. Some group of physical 
events do the causal work and so there is no space left for the mental states to have done it. 
To claim that there is space would be to say that all actions are in fact over-determined. That 
is, all actions are caused by twice the number of causes that are sufficient to bring the 
behaviour about. This offends against our cherished principle of parsimony, namely the 
general heuristic which states that if two theories are equally tenable the simpler one is to be 
preferred. Thus we see a prima facie case for the incompatibilist intuition. 
l5For further discussion of this issue see Jaegwon Kim' s Supervenience and Mind, 
Chapter 13 where he echoes Malcolm' s concern. 
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The upshot of this discussion is that mechanism does displace the purposive. Is this enough 
to allay fears of 'waspishness'? Clearly not, for it may prove to be true of us that our 
behaviour is explainable from a mechanistic stance. In fact, for the purposes of discussion we 
have assumed such an eventuality and have sought to probe its implications. What we have 
found is that a chauvinistic prejudice has alerted us to an incompatibility between two sorts 
of explanation for which we can at least provide some unsophisticated common sense 
reasoning. The argument does not justifY our chauvinism but it does give substance to our 
retraction of the intentional explanation of mechanistically explained behaviour. I note again 
that as it stands this argument does not refute a compatibilist position that makes intentional 
events such as wantings, believings and desirings identical with complex physical events such 
as particular neural configurations or whatever. Such a position clearly allows for an 
explanatory compatibilism but it is not clear whether we could reconcile it with our intuitions 
about agency. Be this as it may, we are concerned here only to provide an illumination of folk-
intuitions regarding mechanistic and intentional explanations. The basic fact that I take to 
have been established is that ordinarily we accept that mechanistic explanation displaces 
intentional explanations. 
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4.0 Dennett's Compatibilist Move 
In the previous section we saw that there is at least a prima facie case for explanatory 
incompatibilism. We also saw that one possible move that can be made to avoid this 
incompatibilism is to adopt a version of reductive materialism. I suggested that this might be 
a successful route to go but that I would not be examining it. I now wish to focus on Dennett's 
work in this area. He does not opt for the reductive materialist line but still tries to preserve 
some kind of explanatory compatibilism. Basically I am going to examine the manner in 
which he attempts to effectively bypass the prima facie case previously established. Central 
to his perspective on this matter is his presentation of what he calls the intentional stance. 
This is ostensibly a stance we can adopt toward certain things in predicting or explaining their 
behaviour. I shall begin by providing an analysis of this stance and the two mechanistic 
stances that Dennett distinguishes it from. I then show that on Dennett's account there is a 
primafacie case for accepting an explanatory compatibilism. I draw out the details of how this 
case can, in Dennett's eyes, be fleshed out toward a full-fledged explanatory compatibilism. 
4.i The intentional Stance Distinguished and Discussed 
Dennett offers us three different systematic methods of predicting and explaining the 
behaviour of objects or systems. The first two methods that Dennett discusses are mechanistic 
contenders for the explanation and prediction of behaviour. Dennett introduces them as 
touchstones for what he calls the intentional strategy. The intentional strategy is a predictive 
strategy that is not mechanistic in nature. 
The first strategy we can use to explain or predict the behaviour of a system involves 
adopting what Dennett has called the design stance. He uses the example of a chess playing 
computer: 
If one knows exactly how the computer is designed ... one can predict its designed 
response to any move one makes .... One's prediction will come true provided only that 
the computer performs as designed - that is, without breakdown. Different varieties of 
design-stance prediction can be discerned, but all are alike in relying on the notion of 
a function, which is purpose relative or teleological.... The essential feature of the 
design stance is that we make predictions solely from knowledge or assumptions about 
the system's functional design, irrespective of the physical constitution or condition 
of the innards of the particular object. (Brainstorms p. 4; for a similar passage see 
Brainstorms p. 237) 
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To view the design stance in action consider the following example. There is a button 
mounted on the outer frame of my front door. I predict that when that button is pushed a 
buzzer will sound. Why? Because when I designed my doorbell I made it so that pushing the 
button in question would close a circuit. This allows an electric current to pass through an 
electro-magnet turning it on and causing a metal clapper to move toward it. This causes the 
clapper to break contact with a metal plate which it needs to be in contact with in order for the 
circuit to remain closed. As this happens the electro-magnet is turned off, releasing the clapper 
so that it falls back onto the metal plate allowing the process to begin again as long as the 
button is depressed. This happens rapidly producing a buzzing sound. Note that these details 
about the physical operation of the system give me knowledge of the design that I need in 
order to make the prediction. I am assuming that all of these conditions will be satisfied when 
I make my prediction. A less complex, and (if you have ever stood outside trying to ring a 
broken doorbell) less successful, version of the design stance in action using the same 
apparatus is the functional prediction that some noise will happen when the button is pressed 
because that is the nature of doorbells. 
The second strategy that we can adopt in predicting the behaviour of a system Dennett 
calls the physical stance. The physical stance is straight-forwardly mechanistic in nature. 
From this stance our predictions are based on the actual physical state of the particular 
object, and are worked out by applying whatever knowledge we have of the laws of 
nature. It is from this stance alone that we can predict the malfunction of systems ... . 
One seldom adopts the physical stance in dealing with a computer just because the 
number of critical variables in the physical constitution of a computer would 
overwhelm the most prodigious calculator. Significantly, the physical stance is 
generally reserved for instances of breakdown, where the condition preventing normal 
operation is generalized and easily locatable .... Attempting to give a physical account 
or prediction of the chess-playing computer would be a ... herculean labor, but it 
would work in principle. (Brainstorms pp. 4-5 ; pp. 237-8) 
Returning to my home-made doorbell example; when the buzzer does not work - that is, 
there is a failure in designed function and my prediction from the design stance fails - I am 
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forced to adopt the physical stance. Basically, I reason that there is something preventing the 
mechanism from operating as designed and so look to it's physical state for an explanation. 
In this case it might be any of a number of things - a loose connection, a disconnected wire, 
some fluff between the clapper and the plate, dust jamming the hinge on the clapper, or a 
faulty or disconnected power source. The simplicity of the system makes it comparatively easy 
to list and test the possible problems but as systems become more complex the variables 
increase dramatically and it becomes increasingly difficult to adopt the stance successfully. 
One should note however that for any purely physical system this stance is a superior 
stance to adopt as it guarantees a correct prediction or explanation of the behaviour of the 
system as described. The reason for this lies in the fact that for a purely physical system we 
have to assume what is commonly called the principle of causal closure. 16 This principle states 
that any physical event that has a cause has a physical cause. In other words it exploits exactly 
the same idea that mechanism exploits. So when we are faced with a physical system and we 
want to predict its behaviour, adopting the physical stance toward it means that whatever we 
isolate as the cause of the behaviour will completely explain the behaviour. Given that the 
explanation is thus necessarily complete it must also be correct. There is no space left for 
something else to feature in the 'correct' explanation. So in terms of both success and 
accuracy the physical stance cannot be improved upon. As long, that is, as the behaviour being 
explained or predicted is that of a physical system. It is only complexity and the restricted 
nature of calculators (human or machine) that often make the stance impractical. 
Both of these stances are mechanistic contenders for the explanation or prediction of 
behaviour. In the course of this project I will talk about the mechanistic stance (to be 
contrasted with the intentional stance) and I will have Dennett's physical stance in mind. This 
is simply to avoid unnecessary complexity and possible confusion. The fact is noted, however, 
that both design and physical explanations are essentially mechanistic in nature. These are to 
be contrasted with a different type of explanation, namely intentional explanation. The stance 
in question is appropriately called the intentional stance and involves adopting the following 
strategy: 
16 See for example, Jaegwon Kim Supervenience and Mind pp. 280-1, where we find that 
this principle should be accepted in the face of a commitment to naturalism and physicalism. 
This [the intentional stance] tends to be most appropriate when the system one is 
dealing with is too complex to be dealt with effectively from the other stances. In the 
case of the chess-playing computer one adopts this stance when one tries to predict its 
response to one's move by figuring out what a good or reasonable response would be, 
given the information the computer has about the situation. Here one assumes not just 
the absence of malfunction, but the rationality of design or programming as well.... 
Whenever one can successfully adopt the Intentional Stance toward an object, I call 
that object an Intentional System. The success of the stance is of course a matter 
settled pragmatically, without reference to whether or not the object really has beliefs, 
intentions and so forth; so whether or not any computer can be conscious, or have 
thoughts or desires, some computers undeniably are intentional systems, for they are 
systems whose behaviour can be predicted, and most efficiently predicted, by adopting 
the intentional stance. (Brainstorms pp. 237-8; for a similar but more detailed 
discussion see Brainstorms pp. 5-7) 
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The intentional stance is characterised just by our ability to construct an explanation of 
a system's behaviour that cites intentional states as the reasons for the behaviour and that 
makes the behaviour under examination reasonable. Working with Dennett' s chess-playing 
computer then, we can imagine the following scenario. The computer takes my queen. I wish 
to explain why it did this. I find that if! ascribe to the computer certain chess oriented beliefs 
and desires then I can provide an explanation of its taking my queen that is reasonable and 
intentional. So I say that the computer has the desire to win, the belief that my queen poses 
a major threat to its king, and the belief that having ones own king threatened is an obstacle 
to victory. Now, assuming rationality, I can say that the reason the computer took my queen 
lies in those beliefs and desires. Consider the strand of practical reasoning that demonstrates 
this: If one desires to win, then one ought to remove obstacles to victory. I [the computer 1 
desire to win, so I must remove obstacles to victory. If my opponent' s queen poses a major 
threat to my king, then it is an obstacle to victory. I believe that said queen does pose such a 
threat, so it is an obstacle to my victory. Putting the two conclusions together we find the 
behaviour rationally and intentionally explained. 
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4.2 Dennett 's Compatibilist Move 
Dennett examines two basic reasons people might have for claiming that mechanistic 
explanations displace the intentional, or at least that there is an antagonism between the two 
sorts of explanation. The first of these, suggests Dennett, is that there is an absence of an 
assumption of rationality at the mechanistic level, while the second pertains to the idea that 
reasons are distinct from causes.(Dennett, (1978) p. 247) I shall now examine Dennett's 
treatment of both issues. The idea here is not to engage in a dispute about what Dennett says 
but simply to gain clarity on how it is that Dennett thinks he can avoid the incompatibilist 
position. We must note at the outset that his description of the intentional stance is such that 
it seems clear that he can do so. Consider that we say that the explanation of the behaviour of 
the chess-playing computer from the intentional stance at least has the appearance of being 
a genuine intentional explanation. It fulfills all the previously established criteria for an 
explanation to be intentional, that is it cites intentional states as the reasons for the behaviour 
and it rationalises that behaviour. At the same time however we also know that the computer 
does what it does merely as a result of certain electrical processes in its central processing 
unit. We even have Dennett's admission that "attempting to give a physical account or 
prediction of the chess-playing computer would be a ... herculean labor, but it would work in 
principle. (Dennett, (1978) pp. 4-5; pp. 237-8) So there does seem to be a case for saying that 
the two sorts of explanations are in fact compatible. Just because the mechanistic explanation 
is possible does not mean that we retract our intentional explanation. The fact is, however, that 
this case only establishes that we can use intentional explanations of mechanistically caused 
behaviour, but just presenting the example does not in itself make a case for compatibilism. 
It simply bolsters the idea that the use of intentional idioms can be seen as a useful 
anthropomorphisation. The case does not establish the further issue that intentional behaviour 
can be legitimately explained mechanistically. This is what Dennett needs to accomplish in 
order to develop a full-fledged explanatory compatibilism. 
Let's tackle Dennett's first concern, namely that the supposed antagonism between 
intentional and mechanistic explanations stems from the absence of a presupposition of 
rationality in the latter case. The basic idea is that when one does not assume rationality the 
behaviour cannot be seen as action since reasons do not feature in the causal milieu of the 
behaviour. Dennett seeks to allay this fear by pointing out that "the absence of a 
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presupposition of rationality is not the same as a presupposition of non-rationality"(Dennett, 
(1978) p. 243). It is precisely this claim that grounds Dennett' s compatibilism. The argument 
he seeks to refute suggests that behaviour is rational only if the presentation of logically 
relevant considerations can influence the behaviour. But this means that rational behaviour 
excludes the possibility of it being the effect of sufficient conditions independent of the 
agent's deliberation. Mechanistic explanations by definition pick out such independent 
sufficient conditions and so cannot explain rational behaviour, or action as it is popularly 
called. The upshot is that intentional explanations have as their domain the truly rational while 
mechanistic explanations have the rest. 17 
The question we have to answer, and the answer we have to understand, is how 
mechanistically explained behaviour can indeed still be rational behaviour. Dennett's short 
answer was simply to assert that failing to pitch our enquiry at the level of reason giving is not 
to be in a position where reasons cannot be given. The longer answer involves re-
commissioning Sphex. We saw earlier that Sphex 's behaviour was tropistic. Dennett suggests 
that the only reason we retract our intentional explanation of her behaviour lies in the fact that 
the mechanism of her behaviour is so simple. He says that any simple mechanistic explanation 
of a bit of behaviour will disqualifY it for a plausible intentional explanation. But what 
happens if as wasp designers we try to enlarge Sphex 's tropistic reactions to the environment 
so as to create a more rational fit to whatever nature puts in her path. Imagine that we program 
her to hurriedly retrieve the cricket instead of getting stuck in the hole-checking subroutine 
and we program her to fly around and seek the obviously external danger. After a while she 
would behave in a way that we would not even consider tropistic. Explaining what she does 
mechanistically might take volumes of material. Is there any plausibility in claiming that her 
behaviour is merely mechanistic? It is true that it is mechanistic, but what is the force ofthe 
merely in this case? What would be its force if we were handed twenty volumes of fme print? 
Dennett contends that the only force would lie in the fact that ultimately the organism, human 
or wasp, is only imperfectly rational.(Dennett, (1978) p. 245) What this means is that our 
original regard for the rationality of a system stems from an internal perspective but from an 
objective point of view we find that behaviour just does not always measure up to what the 
17Dennett discusses this in "Mechanism and Responsibility" p. 244. For a more detailed 
exposition see MacIntyre, A.C. "Determinism" in Mind, 1957, pp.248ff. 
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system ought to do. The implication is, of course, that imperfectly rational the organism may 
be but rational it is nonetheless. 
On Dennett's account we cannot say that mechanistic explanations displace intentional 
explanations. As his thought experiment regarding the wasp designers is meant to show, it 
does not follow from a particular mechanistic explanation that the bit of behaviour is or is not 
rational. Dennett tells us that the fact that a particular response had to follow casts no more 
doubt on its rationality than the fact that the computer's having to answer '25 ' to the input 
'5*5=7' casts doubt on the arithmetic correctness of the answer.(Dennett, (1978) p. 246) What 
we see here is Dennett developing a conception of rationality whereby the rationality of 
behaviour is simply a matter of the behaviour being logically appropriate to the goals of the 
system and not the marmer in which the behaviour was initiated. Dennett's conception of 
rationality could be formalised in the following way: Behaviour is rational just in case we can 
tell a story where there is information that the system could be said to have which logically 
entails that behaviour. IS This is a broad conception of rationality and can be contrasted with 
a narrower understanding. On the narrow alternative, behaviour is rational if and only if there 
is information, in the form of beliefs and desires, that the system has which logically entails 
the behaviour and where the system either implicitly or explicitly exploits that logical 
relationship in initiating the behaviour. Dennett's notion of rationality and the alternative 
suggested is an important issue and is one to which I return in the following chapter. For now 
I want to simply address the notion of 'information a system could be said to have' . 
I established earlier that action is delimited by whether an intentional explanation of the 
behaviour is true. I also showed that intentional explanations typically cite beliefs and desires 
as the reasons for behaviour. In the case of the chess-playing computer we saw that certain 
beliefs and desires could be ascribed to the computer which made its action of taking my 
queen reasonable. These beliefs and desires are what is meant by ' information a system could 
be said to have'. Consequently it is important to understand Dennett's position on the nature 
ISIt has been suggested to me that this formulation is so harsh that I might be setting up 
a straw man. I acknowledge that this is a strongly instrumentalist conception of rationality, but 
I also believe that it accurately sums Dennett' s position. I shall return to this in detail later. For 
now it should be noted that I am not suggesting that Dennett's entire position is so radically 
instrumentalistic and that the focus here isjust the notion of rationality. 
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of beliefs and desires before we can have an accurate and detailed understanding of his 
compatibilist move. 
The issue of the nature of beliefs and desires also bears strongly on the second reason 
Dennett isolates for the intuition that mechanistic and intentional explanations conflict. This 
second reason stems from the idea that reasons are distinct from causes. Dennett suggests that 
the distinction between reason giving and cause giving fosters the idea that reasoning cannot 
affect a causal chain and thus that mechanistic explanations displace intentional ones. On this 
point Dennett urges that the intuition is false. While he accepts the idea that one cannot argue 
with something that is incapable of understanding he totally rejects the insinuation that an 
argument cannot affect a causal chain. He points out that the presentation of an argument has 
all sorts of affects on the causal environment. Arguments set air molecules in motion, make 
ear-drums vibrate, and have affects in the brain of the audience. Reasons can affect the causal 
path toward behaviour and causes can themselves be directly and causally related to reasons. 
Dennett feels that he has secured the case against the incompatibilist intuition. He has 
shown that the rationality of behaviour is unaffected by whatever constraints it occurs under 
and that reason giving is compatible with cause giving. This is the basis of what I have called 
Dennett' s compatibilist move. As I suggested earlier, however, we need to understand 
Dennett's conception of belief before his position can be laid bare. It is to the notion of belief 
that I tum in the next section. 
4.3 Belief and desire according to Dennett 
Recall that in the previous section we saw that Dennett's conception of rationality allows 
him space to deny the incompatibilist intuition that intentional explanations are somehow 
undermined by the fact that mechanistic explanations of the same behaviour do not assume 
rationality. The conception of rationality held by Dennett was established to be such that 
behaviour is rational just in case we can tell a story where there is information that the system 
could be said to have which logically entails that behaviour. I also suggested that by 
' information that the system could be said to have' was meant 'those beliefs and desires that 
feature in intentional explanation ' . To fully understand Dennett' s position then we have to 
understand his conception of beliefs and desires. 
With regard to belief and the intentional stance Dennett tells us that: 
Lingering doubts about whether the chess-playing computer really has beliefs and 
desires are misplaced; ... the definition of intentional systems I [Dennett] have given 
does not say that intentional systems really have beliefs and desires, but that one can 
explain and predict their behaviour by ascribing beliefs and desires to them, and 
whether one calls what one ascribes to the computer beliefs or belief-analogues or 
information complexes or intentional whatnots makes no difference to the nature of 
the calculation one makes on the basis of the ascriptions. (Brainstorms p.7) 
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This suggests that Dennett's position is one where the beliefs ascribed from the 
intentional stance are simply explanatory aides. As such we could say that for Dennett beliefs 
and desires are instrumental notions. They are to be attributed to the extent that their 
ascription makes the stance work as a predictive or explanatory tool. What this means is that 
the existence of beliefs and desires in this context is dependent on the particular interpretive 
position one adopts toward the system. Such a position is what Dennett, in The Intentional 
Stance, calls radical interpretationism. Dennett claims, however, that his position also 
encompasses what he calls radical realism. (Dennett, (1987) p.IS) This realism is the idea that 
whether one has a particular belief or not is a perfectly objective internal fact about one that 
could, in principle, be discerned by physiological examination. So we need to see how 
Dennett can claim that belief attribution from the intentional stance picks out objective facts 
about the system and also that wondering whether the system really has beliefs is misplaced. 
Dennett provides an answer in The Intentional Stance. There he claims (Dennett, (1987) 
p. 29) that if a system is reliably and voluminously predictable from the intentional stance then 
it really, in the strongest sense of the word, has the beliefs attributed to it. So basically if the 
intentional strategy works for a system then it really has the beliefs attributed to it for the 
strategy to work. Adopting the stance involves adopting a particular interpretive position 
which makes the existence of beliefs and desires a matter of interpretation and having the 
stance work makes their existence objective in the sense that if they did not really have those 
beliefs then the stance would not work. This sense of beliefs being objective facts about the 
system is slightly different from the realism Dennett identifies however, since discerning the 
existence of these objective beliefs requires adopting an interpretive position. A physiological 
examination need not, and perhaps will not, reveal them to us. 
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Why is doubting that a chess-playing computer (an intentional system) really has beliefs 
misplaced? Simply because the concept of belief entailed by the position does not commit one 
onto logically to beliefs in the way one would have to be committed in order to have the 
doubts. Dennett's account of belief is such that it does not make an assertion as to the 
substance or the manner of instantiation of beliefs but only provides an account of what it is 
to have a belief, namely to be voluminously predictable from the intentional stance. 
4.4 A Final Word 
I believe that the case for Dennett' s compatibilism is now complete. I have shown that 
he begins from a position where there is an abundantly clear prima facie case for some sort 
of compatibilism between intentional and mechanistic explanations. I used this as a spring-
board for a deeper investigation into Dennett's ideas. This investigation revealed that Dennett 
has what looks to be a solid argument against the incompatibilist notion that rational 
behaviour cannot be explained mechanistically but that it rests on a particular conception of 
rationality. This conception of rationality, I claimed, was a broad conception which suggested 
that rationality was a matter of external assessment. If rational agents could plausibly tell a 
story about the motivating beliefs and desires of the behaver so that it was clear that the 
beliefs and desires logically entailed that particular bit of behaviour then the behaviour was 
rational. I fleshed this out with a discussion of Dennett's notion of beliefs and suggested that 
he sought to retain a "realist-instrumentalist" position in their regard. Finally I also suggested 
that Dennett's conception of rationality could be contrasted with a narrower conception and 
it is to that issue which we now turn. I now begin to put some pressure on Dennett's 
compatibilist position. I wish to show that there is at least an element of doubt as to the 
defensibility of his position and that given the strong case for explanatory incompatibilism 
Dennett' s position must ultimately remain questionable. 
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5.0 Two Difforent Senses of 'Rationality' 
In concluding the previous section I suggested that Dennett's conception of rationality 
could be contrasted with a different conception. In this section I propose to detail that contrast. 
The line of argument will be to show that Dennett's conception rests on external criteria and 
is in an important sense artificial and designed. This is to be contrasted with a conception that 
makes rationality an internal affair. I argue that this differing conception of rationality fits 
better with our folk intuitions regarding action and agency. In this way I argue that Dennett's 
position enjoys a less wholesome place with regard to our ordinary conception of intentional 
explanation than he would have us believe. 
I begin by fleshing out the sense in which a computer could be said to be rational. This 
move is important because it is exactly this sense which Dennett would have us believe is in 
place when we adopt the intentional strategy for explanation. Once we have a clear 
understanding of this notion I discuss what seems to be a case where we are not relying on 
Dennett's conception and thus show that there can be two senses in which our intentional 
characterisations invoke rationality. In drawing out this dual use of the concept I intend to 
open the way to seeing an alternative to Dennett's preferred understanding. Once this has been 
successfully achieved I examine the alternative in some detail, showing that it represents a 
notion closer to our folk understanding and that it is primary to the notion exploited by 
Dennett. 
5.1 Rationality a matter of design 
We are to determine the sense in which a computer could be said to be rational. In other 
words this section needs to establish exactly what it is that we are saying when we say for 
example, that the computer is rational in taking my queen. That this exercise will be 
instructive is perfectly obvious since the rationality of a chess-playing computer is Dennett's 
paradigm example in his exposition of rationality and the intentional stance. So the question 
for now is simply about what we mean in asserting the computer's rationality. 
To make progress on this matter it will be easier if we have a clear example before our 
minds to work from. Recall then our previous case of the rational computer. The scenario was 
relatively simple. A computer is designed to play chess and in the process of a game it 
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captures my queen. Said queen is, from my perspective, putting pressure on the computer' s 
king and is thus a hurdle to the computer' s winning the game. Now we have already seen how 
the move itself can be said to be rational. The move is rational in the sense that it is reasonable 
or, analogously, follows logically from the desire to win and certain beliefs about the rules of 
chess. Thus the move is rational in the sense required from the intentional perspective, for if 
we recall the definition of intentional explanations we find that it is characteristic of them that 
they render the behaviour reasonable in this sense. This is not the sense of rationality under 
examination. Rather we are to examine the sense of rationality that is exploited in actually 
adopting the intentional stance and which is involved in the process whereby we are to, in 
Dennett' s words, "assume .. . the rationality of design or programming." (Dennett, (1978) 
p.238) So the crucial element to our example lies in the computer's being designed to play 
chess rather than the fact that what it does as a chess player is successfully described in the 
language of reason. 
When we assume the rationality of either a computer or its design what are we assuming? 
As a first attempt at answering this question one is tempted to say that we are assuming that 
the computer will respond to relevant input in a manner that will enable us to construct an 
intentional explanation of its response. This answer is in a sense true because if the computer 
did not respond in this way the adoption of the intentional stance as an explanatory strategy 
would fail and so we would be forced to retract our assumption of rationality. But as an 
answer to our question it does not probe deep enough for the assumption of rationality cannot 
just be an assumption of the possibility of a successful intentional explanation. The rationality 
of the system is what makes the intentional strategy work. So there must be something further 
about the system other than its behaviour being explained from the intentional stance that 
makes it rational. We need an understanding of the mechanism whereby a system comes to 
be in a position where the adoption of the intentional strategy becomes viable. 
In attempting to determine what it is to assume that a computer is rational we have seen 
that the answer lies in understanding what it is about the system that enables us to adopt the 
intentional stance. The clue to this answer is to be found in Dennett's suggestion that we are 
to assume the rationality of design of the computer. It is the design of the system that enables 
us to successfully adopt the intentional stance and so our question must now be as to what it 
means for design to be rational. 
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The rationality of design is typically a product of evolution according to Dennett. 19 The 
first conglomerations of matter that were able to replicate under the right conditions began the 
process. Things or circumstances that aided survival or replication were 'good' for them, 
things that did not were 'bad'. As these replicators20 evolved into organisms with a means to 
aiding their survival and replication they brought into being a point of view from which things 
in the world could be viewed as favourable, unfavourable or neutral. This point of view is 
what Dennett calls the replicators' 'good'. When a system, be it primordial slime, chess-
playing computer1 or human is realising its good it is flourishing. Through evolution and 
natural selection these systems develop in such a way as to get better and better at realising 
their good. This development, according to Dennett, is often characterised by the system 
making certain tradeoffs such as, for example, one between truth and accuracy of reporting 
for speed and economy. If a system reaches a point where more often than not it is successful 
in achieving its good it's design might be said to be optimal. That is, its design is such that 
generally the system will be teleologically successful. 
So for Dennett, design is rational if with regard to the manifest interests of the system it 
generally ensures their realisation. As Dennett says in The Intentional Stance "I want to use 
' rational' as a general-purpose term of cognitive approval." (Dennett, (1987) p. 97) When we 
can approve of what the system is doing, or failing to do, in terms of what we understand its 
interests to be it is rational. This shows that there is indeed more than a grain of truth in our 
first attempt at answering the question as to what exactly we are assuming when we assume 
rationality of design. Recall that the suggestion was that one is tempted to say that we are 
assuming that the computer will respond to relevant input in a marmer that will enable us to 
construct an intentional explanation of its response. We have seen that when we assume 
19See Dennett's Consciousness Explained (1991) pp 173-182 for a discussion ofthis. 
2°The term is originally Dawkins' from The Selfish Gene (1976) but is appropriated by 
Dennett in Consciousness Explained. 
21While it may seem perverse to claim that chess-playing computers evolve we can 
nevertheless make sense of the notion. The computer has an interest in calculating and evaluating 
moves swiftly and so processing speed is an environmental pressure for it. If it is to improve as 
a player it will need to develop faster information processing. The programmer plays the role of 
nature, and conquest by the grand masters that of natural selection. 
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rationality of design we are asswning that the system is designed in such a way as to generally 
guarantee success with respect to its range of interests. We are not asswning that, with regard 
to the computer for example, when we give it any information it will behave appropriately but 
only that given relevant information it will tend toward an appropriate response. 
One thing that is particularly noteworthy of this account is that the best response is not 
required of the system in order to say that it is rational. By 'best' here we can understand those 
responses that actually satisfY the system's interests. The reason why this is not a requirement 
lies in the idea that the system may, in evolving into a more successful specimen, develop in 
such a way, to use an example already suggested, as to favour speed over accuracy. Such 
development may result in periodic false alarms but as a result may have even better survival 
value. Consider that a person who is quick to run away from seemingly dangerous situations 
will sometimes flee from the harmless but is less likely to be caught out on the truly perilous 
occasion than the person who spends time trying to assess the level ofthreat. Similarly, the 
chess-playing computer could in principle calculate all the possible moves resulting from the 
current piece configuration but doing so would result in time penalties and perhaps the 
forfeiture of the game. 
In making the chief criterion for rationality a matter of the system' s for the most part 
realising its interests Dennett makes rationality a matter of objective assessment. A computer's 
rationality is determined by whether it typically behaves in such a way as to further its 
interests. It does not matter in the least as to how it comes about that the computer behaves 
in this way. There is no need for the computer to be aware of what it is doing or even for it 
have any of the so-called intentional states. As a result its rationality is an external matter, it 
hangs simply on an objective fit between behaviour and interests. Simply by determining what 
the system is trying22 to do and thereby developing a conception of its interests coupled with 
an observation of the success of its behaviour we can judge its rationality. Consider the lowly 
calculator for example. Its function is to calculate the answers to various mathematical 
problems. Ifit is to 'survive' it needs to calculate accurately, and so accuracy in calculation 
forms the major part of its interests. Observing its behaviour we find that prompted with all 
2~othing hangs on this use of an intentional term. I would use a word like ' function' but 
it has too much in the way of philosophical baggage which I could not possibly address here. 
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sorts of different mathematical problems it does yield the correct answers. The calculator is 
thus rational. This, then, is Dennett' s conception of what we assume when we adopt the 
intentional stance toward it. 
Is there any real difference between a system's being rational and a bit of its behaviour 
being rational on Dennett's account? This question is motivated by the fact that earlier 
(section 4.2) I suggested that the question of a bit of behaviour's being rational is a matter of 
seeing whether we can tell the appropriate intentional story to explain the behaviour. Now we 
have a situation where the rationality of a system is a matter of whether its behaviour generally 
realises its interests. These two characterisations are actually very closely linked. Being able 
to provide an intentional explanation of behaviour means that the behaviour realises the 
system's interests. The difference between the two situations lies in the fact that a system 
which is not rational in the sense of generally satisfYing its interests may produce an instance 
of behaviour which does satisfY its interests. So we can have an irrational system happening 
to behave rationally. By the same token because the demand of rationality is not perfection 
in terms of realising interests it is possible for a rational system to behave in a manner which 
defies intentional explanation. In both cases, however, the systems could not behave in the 
relevant ways as a matter of course. If they were to behave as described regularly and with few 
lapses we would have to re-evaluate our ascriptions of rationality or irrationality. In the case 
of the irrational system that regularly behaved rationally we would have to revise its status to 
that of being rational and in the case of the rational system that behaves irrationally we would 
have to say that it is in fact irrational as a system. This highlights once again the fact that the 
criteria for judging the rationality or otherwise of a system lie outside the system with the 
publicly ascertainable success ratio of its behaviour. Because of this significant feature in 
Dennett's conception of rationality I am going to label it method-independent rationalil)J3. 
The label merely picks out the fact that how the system came to behave rationally is not an 
issue. 
5.2 A different sense of 'rational' 
Up to this point I have simply drawn out the conception of rationality that Dennett thinks 
23This is as opposed to method-dependent rationality which I discuss shortly. Its main 
feature is that the how of the behaviour plays a vital role in the ascription ofrationality. 
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is exploited when adopting the intentional stance. I have shown that this conception is 
characterised by the idea that something is rational if its behaviour is such that it mostly 
satisfies the interests of the system. We saw that the means by which this is accomplished by 
the system are not relevant on Dennett's conception. This sense of rationality, I have 
suggested, is a product of design or evolution and is objective in that it consists in there being 
a public, open fit between behaviour and interests. This method-independent rationality is the 
means by which Dennett sustains his explanatory compatibilism. A mechanistic system such 
as a computer is rational in Dennett's sense and by conceiving of rationality in this way we 
can easily adopt the intentional stance toward it. When we assume that the system is rational 
we are simply assuming that given its interests it will behave so as to satisfy them. When we 
adopt the intentional stance we characterise its interests in terms of certain beliefs and desires 
which when put together suggest behaving in a manner which, objectively speaking, would 
satisfy those interests. By assuming that the system is rational in the sense discussed we 
assume the success of the intentional characterisation. That the system might be a mechanistic 
one makes no difference. 
I now wish to show that Dennett's conception of rationality is not always the conception 
we employ when adopting the intentional stance. The idea is to show that in some instances 
of providing intentional explanations we use a very different concept. The present question 
is, then, whether we are in fact assuming method-independent rationality when we 
characterise systems intentionally. The way forward will be to ascertain what conditions 
prompt us to retract intentional characterisations and our ascriptions of rationality. I propose 
that in at least one type of case we withdraw our assumption because we are operating with 
a different conception of rationality. 
The first and most obvious case where we retract our assumption of rationality is when 
it actually fails. There are two basic scenarios that can be characterised in this way. One would 
be the case of the onset of say, senility or some dementia. The other would be the case of the 
talking parrot. When we are faced with a person who is becoming demented but who 
previously was in perfect command of their senses we are forced into the tragic position of 
suspecting their rationality. Where before their behaviour was such as to be reasonable given 
their professed interests and beliefs it becomes less and less reasonable. Eventually we retract 
any ascription of rationality we may once have made. On similar, but lighter, lines imagine 
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the following scenario. Paul goes to visit an acquaintance who has recently acquired a parrot. 
As he sees it he says, "Hello Ms Parrot, I'm Paul." If the parrot were to reply, "Hello Paul, I'm 
Molly," he would think that the parrot is rational.(Paul has little experience of talking parrots!) 
Then when, a few minutes later, the parrot again proclaims "Hello Paul, I'm Molly," Paul 
replies, "So you said, are you having a good day?" to which the parrot responds "Hello Paul, 
I'm Molly," he retracts his ascription, confused. 
In both of these cases we see a retraction of the ascription of rationality. The reasons are 
both very similar, behaviourally both the demented person and the parrot fail a test for agency 
- their behaviour cannot be explained intentionally. The problem here is that this is exactly the 
same reason Dennett would cite for their lack of rationality. As possible scenarios for testing 
Dennett's position they are not adequate to the task. What we have to find, then, is a species 
of case where we would retract an ascription of rationality but where Dennett would cling to 
his. If this can be done we will have discovered that we do not in fact operate toward 
intentional systems on the level of method-independent rationality. 
One such case has already been discussed, namely that of Sphex. When we first encounter 
this wasp we ascribe rationality to it. When we discover that her behaviour is tropistic we 
retract our ascription. She is no longer clever but rather just another example of how nature 
cares for her own. It is no longer the mental states which we ascribe to her and the logical 
connections between them that do the work in explaining her behaviour, but a rigidly 
'hardwired' instinct. From Dennett' s perspective Sphex is rational. For the most part her 
behaviour will further her evolutionary interests. It is, after all, a particularly unnatural 
occurrence for a scientist to attempt to bamboozle her and her tropism was not designed to 
detect such deception. So in the case of Sphex we see Dennett holding to his method-
independent rationality ascription while the ordinary person retracts their ascription. This 
serves to show that ordinarily we do not operate toward those things Dennett classifies as 
intentional systems on the terms he suggests. 
Now that we have an example of a case where our folk position differs from Dennett's 
position let us examine the details of the folk perspective. The question under examination 
is simply as to what we are saying or doing when we retract our ascription of rationality from 
a system like Sphex which Dennett would claim is rational. What would we want to be 
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satisfied in order to say that Sphex is rational when the tropistic nature of her behaviour seems 
to render this impossible? One possibility would be that we require it to be possible for a 
system to deliberate over what it is going to do in order for its behaviour to be rational. This 
is not to say that the system has to deliberate over what it is going to do, just that it must be 
able to deliberate over what it is going to do. 
There are five basic elements to the notion of deliberation. The fust of these is that a 
system can only deliberate about its own behaviour and not about the behaviour of another 
system. I can, for example, deliberate over what exactly I am going to write next, but I cannot 
deliberate over whether my reader will understand it or not. I can speculate that my reader will 
understand it or I can surmise this, but I cannot deliberate over it. The second obvious element 
to deliberation is that it can pertain only to future behaviour. What I have done or what I am 
busy doing is not open to deliberation. It is open to recall or cognisance but there can be no 
weighing up of alternatives. Either the behaviour is done or it is being enacted and so the facts 
are already fixed. A third consideration which is related to this is that a system cannot 
deliberate over behaviour that it already knows it is going to do. Because it already knows 
what it is going to do the facts are once again fixed and no deliberation is possible. Say for 
example that I have decided to include five points pertaining to deliberation in my discussion 
of the folk conception of rationality. I cannot now deliberate about whether to include them 
or not. If! did start to have second thoughts about a particular point I might begin to deliberate 
over whether to include all five points or not but then I could not say that I already know what 
I am going to do. Fourthly a system can only deliberate if it believes that in some sense it is 
up to it as to what it is going to do. So if we imagine my going to a dinner party at a friend's 
house I cannot deliberate over whether I shall have chicken or red meat since it is not up to 
me which of these will be prepared. Only if! believe that it is up to me, as I might if my friend 
had asked me to approve the menu which listed chicken or beef as a third course option, could 
I deliberate over which I am going to choose. Finally deliberation involves trying to see the 
logical implications of one' s beliefs, desires, and proposed courses of action. Doing this is 
what must ultimately enable us to make up our minds.24 
24 Much of this paragraph is prompted by Richard Taylor's section on 'deliberation' in 
Metaphysics pp. 39-40. He of course is not concerned with rationality as such but rather with the 
(continued ... ) 
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Now on the face of it, it may seem clear that Sphex could deliberate over what to do when 
she finds that the cricket has been moved. There does not seem to be any reason to suppose 
that she does not believe that what she does is up to her, even though we know otherwise. Just 
as I can deliberate over what to order for dinner even though some of the possibilities I 
entertain are not true possibilities because of a temporary unavailability, so Sphex could 
deliberate about whether to check the burrow again or to just haul the cricket in even though 
her circumstances are such as to render the latter an impossible option. Such, anyway, is the 
case the first time we see her go through the 'hole-checking subroutine' . But after we witness 
the behaviour many times the description of what is going on must surely change. It must be 
clear to Sphex, for instance, that the danger lies outside the hole since it is the cricket that 
moves and not, say, an unknown scent emanating from the mouth of her burrow. With this 
knowledge Sphex ought to try to get the cricket inside and assuming that she does try she will 
quickly discover that she is stuck in her 'hole-checking subroutine'. This would shake her 
belief that it is up to her what she is going to do and so render deliberation impossible. 
Assuming that this does not happen however it is also clear that after going through the 
subroutine for the umpteenth time Sphex has more than just a good idea as to what she is 
going to do when she finds that the cricket has been moved again.25 In effect then the sheer 
repetition of experience places deliberation far outside the reach of Sphex. Given that she is 
not able to deliberate over her behaviour she cannot be rational in the folk sense. 
A related consideration involved in whether we deem behaviour rational or not is that we 
require the behaviour to be a result of the agent's proceeding as she does because of her 
awareness of the course of action implied by her interests. So not only must she be able to 
weigh up alternatives and deliberate about which she will do, she must also do what she does 
because of this deliberation. In Sphex 's case her behaviour is a result of certain antecedent 
events. Any awareness she might have of the course of action implied by her interests can 
'Y··continued) 
problem of free will. 
" I am of course assuming that Sphex has not read Hume's Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding and had her faith in inductive reasoning shattered. Whatever the case, however, 
even Hume accepts the use made of 'conclusions based on experience' , he just cautions us to be 
aware that they are not founded on reasoning per se. 
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surely play no role in her behaving. For the sake of argument let us assume that Sphex is a 
conscious or an aware system. So we assume that she is cognisant of the course of action 
implied by her interests. It is clear that she carmot possibly believe that there is something in 
her hole because she was in it when the cricket was moved. So if her checking the hole was 
to get information regarding the safety situation in the hole, she has it. The movement of the 
cricket would imply that there is in fact some threat outside the hole. So her beliefs and 
desires are such as to imply that she ought to get the cricket inside as soon as possible, not that 
she ought to check the hole for lurking predators. Now we have assumed that she is aware of 
this and in light of this assumption we can make no sense of her subsequent behaviour being 
as a result of her awareness. Her subsequent behaviour just does not bear out such a 
consideration for she does not behave in accord with the reasonable dictates of her awareness. 
The only way we could make sense of Sphex 's behaviour in this way would be to add an ad 
hoc desire to behave in a marmer contrary to that dictated by reason. This would mean that in 
being aware of what reason says she should do and in having a desire not to do the reasonable 
thing, the appearance of Sphex 's being stuck in the 'hole-checking subroutine' can be rendered 
understandable. But considerations of simplicity and economy of explanation make this route 
completely implausible. The mechanistic explanation of her behaviour just rings truer and 
explains more of her behaviour and so using Ockham's famous razor we must cut away the 
unnecessarily complex theory which ascribes consciousness and ad hoc intentional states. 
The scenario we have been considering is perhaps better understood by means of a 
different example. Recall that we assumed that Sphex is aware of what she ought to do. I 
suggested that on a folk conception we would require such an awareness and that the 
awareness playa role in causing the behaviour. We have seen that for Sphex this second 
condition carmot plausibly be said to have been met. But what is it like for Sphex? Why would 
we say that this sort of scenario is to be excluded from the group of cases we would 
characterise as rational? The situation is one where the awareness of what ought to be done 
is epiphenomenal in the strictest and most pejorative sense. A little thought experiment will 
bring the issue out nicely. Imagine that you are Sphex. Know that you are aware that you went 
into the hole to check it out and that while you were there your cricket was moved. You realise 
that all things considered you had best get the cricket inside quickly because something is out 
there. With this awareness in mind, however, you find your legs inexorably moving you 
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towards the burrow, cricket once again abandoned just outside. You might mentally kick 
yourself, saying that this is just against all your better judgements. But when the process 
happens again and again mild dissatisfaction will quickly give way to alarm as you realise that 
your body is out of control. Were someone to presume to tell you that your behaviour was 
rational you might giggle hysterically and say that it was a nice gesture but that your 
interlocutor needs to face the facts. The discovery that you are the flesh and bone equivalent 
of a thinking marionette would be terrifying and would undoubtably furnish you with a strong 
conviction that in all but the most tenuous sense your behaviour is not rational. It is 
abundantly clear then that we require not only an awareness of the course of action implied 
by the system's interests but for that awareness to play some sort of causal role in the 
behaviour. On these grounds then, we retract our ascription of rationality to Sphex.z6 
What we find emerging from this discussion is a conception of rationality that is based 
on the way behaviour comes about as opposed to the success ofthe behaviour. The criteria for 
judging rationality are no longer the objective, publicly ascertainable fit between the 
behaviour and the ascribed intentional states of the system and lie rather with the process of 
the system's coming to behave as it does. Of course the notion of the agent somehow causing 
the behaviour because of the logical dictates of her interests is a mysterious one. Our scientific 
understanding of causation relies on antecedent events being causes and now we have a 
situation where an object, namely the agent, is the cause. Mystery aside, however, this is the 
understanding that supports and is supported by the folk conception of rationality. Because 
the manner in which the behaviour comes about is so important on this conception I call it 
method-dependent rationality. 
The chief characteristic of method-dependent rationality lies in its subjective nature. 
Method-dependent rationality is subjective in the sense that it is internal, it pertains to the 
individual consciousness and is not as such, publicly visible. I do not want to suggest that in 
being subjective method-dependent rationality is merely a matter of interpretive stance or that 
26It has been suggested to me that maybe all that is going wrong with Sphex is that she has 
a very short memory. So she simply doesn't remember that she has already checked her hole. 
This move cannot work. Sphex remembers that she dug a hole, she remembers where it is while 
she goes off to hunt for a cricket, and she successfully hunts - things that would be completely 
impossible were she unable to remember from moment to moment! 
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it is an imaginary or distorted concept. With regard to its existence then, method-dependent 
rationality is to be considered a perfectly objective concept. Due to its internality however it 
is notoriously difficult to say with certainty that a system is employing method-dependent 
rationality in a particular instance. Consequently I am not going to attempt to provide a 
systematic breakdown of how we can identify systems that are in fact method-dependent 
rational. Instead I am going to provide a negative method. The idea is to supply a perfectly 
objective test for whether this form of rationality is even possible for a system. In this manner 
we can exclude certain systems from the potential group of method-dependent rational 
systems. In other words, if a system passes the test then it might be rational in this sense. If 
on the other hand the system cannot pass the test in that any of the criteria cannot be met due 
to the very nature of the system then we can rule out the possibility of it being method-
dependent rational altogether. 
There are three basic criteria which we can use. Firstly we require it to be possible to 
deliberate about the course of action. This is what we might call the freedom criterion. 
Secondly we require that the behaviour follows logically from the system's intentional states, 
that is, given the system's beliefs and desires a train of practical reasoning can be developed 
with the behaviour as its conclusion. This would be a success criterion and is basically the 
criterion that Dennett employs for the evaluation of instances of behaviour. All that it requires 
is that we be able to give an intentional explanation. Finally we require that the behaviour 
come about because of the system's awareness of the logical implications of its beliefs and 
desires. For want of a better term I think of this as the causal criterion. I will briefly discuss 
each in tum. 
The freedom criterion first then. Recall that the notion of method-dependent rationality 
pertains to the process of the system's coming to behave as it does. One requirement we have 
regarding this process is that it must involve the possibility of deliberation. Now deliberation 
is only possible with an attendant belief in one's freedom, that is that it is up to the system as 
to what it is going to do. So if a system believed that it had some choice over what it was 
going to do and that whatever was opted for was in fact up to it, then it would be possible for 
it to deliberate. There are two basic ways in which a system could fail this criterion for 
method-dependent rationality. In the first place it could simply be the case that the system 
does not have the required belief. This might come about when the system is either aware of 
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some constraint on its behaviour or where the system simply believes albeit mistakenly that 
there is such a constraint. An example of the first sort would be where a person cannot 
deliberate as to whether she is going to remain on the ground or gently float upwards into the 
sky. In this case she would be aware that it is not up to her and that her weight plus gravity 
constitute a physical restraint on her gently drifting into the air. In this respect then she would 
not believe in her freedom and so her staying on the ground would not be a rational matter. 
An example of the second sort would be where a person could not deliberate as to whether to 
switch a light on because she is under the mistaken impression that the power is down. In 
other words, she believes mistakenly that the future is fixed, she cannot deliberate about 
turning on the light because she believes that even if she tries to she will be thwarted. The 
second basic way in which a system could fail this criterion for method-dependent rationality 
would be where the experience of the system was such as to challenge its belief. The obvious 
example here is the case where there is a breakdown between what the system wills and what 
it actually does. So I will myself to yank open the door and find that I cannot do so because 
the door is locked. This would challenge my belief that I am free to leave the room and so in 
my subsequent behaviour of 'staying put' I could not be considered method-dependent 
rational. 
The second criterion that we can use to test a system for possibly being method-dependent 
rational is the success criterion. This criterion is simply that the behaviour of the system 
follows logically from its beliefs and desires. I have already intimated that this is basically the 
criterion that Dennett employs for the evaluation of behaviour. With regard to systems as a 
whole however he has a weakened version of the criterion. As we have already seen, he 
requires only that the system behave in this logically coherent manner for the most part. I 
think that Dennett has a valuable insight on this matter since making the requirement such that 
all behaviour must follow logically ultimately excludes all systems we know from being 
method-dependent rational. Dennett has suggested that this is the route some people might 
opt for in attempting to distinguish between persons and mere mechanisms and he labels it the 
'Einstein-Shakespeare Gambit'. As he points out, nothing short of perfection will do and for 
every supposedly perfect case, thousands of lapses and foibles can be cited. I agree with 
Dennett on this matter and so remain content with the slightly weaker notion. Systems that fail 
this criterion are thus obviously ones which Dennett would exclude from his group of 
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intentional systems also. The obvious example is of course that of the lunatic, whose 
behaviour typically defies reason.27 
Thirdly and finally, we can employ what I have called the causal criterion. I have stated 
that this criterion involves the system's behaviour coming about because of its awareness of 
what its beliefs and desires imply that it ought to do. In effect this means that the behaviour 
does not just come about because of some antecedent event but instead because the system 
brings it about.28 With regard to method-dependent rationality then, the causal criterion 
establishes the type of cause behaviour may have. Events that are antecedent sufficient 
conditions may not be the cause of the behaviour ifit is to be considered rational. The system 
itself must somehow originate the behaviour, in the words I used earlier, the behaviour must 
be a doing and not a happening. Systems whose behaviour is explained by antecedent events 
that are sufficient to bring about the behaviour in question would thus fail this criterion for 
method-dependent rationality. A perfect example would be the case of Sphex discussed above. 
Due to the very nature of the mechanism behind her behaviour it is impossible for her to be 
rational in this sense. Because of the tropistic nature of her behaviour it is impossible that her 
behaviour comes about because of her awareness of the logical implications of her interests. 
Thus in some cases facts about the system enable us to reach a conclusion as to whether the 
system is even capable of method-dependent rationality. 
When a system cannot be shown to fail any of the three criteria for method-dependent 
rationality we assume that it is rational in this sense. This is just a matter of charitl9 on our 
2Note that my agreement with Dennett on this matter pertains only to the evaluation of 
behaviour. I don't want to imply that there can be any action that is not method-dependent 
rational. 
28In the present work I am not going to go into the metaphysics of how this is possible, 
time and space do not allow for it. The important thing is that I am merely drawing out the details 
of the folk position on this matter. A number of people have addressed the matter, however, see 
for example Chisholm, R "Freedom and Action" and Clarke, R "Toward A Creditable Agent-
Causal Account of Free Will". 
29The idea comes from Davidson's Principle of Charity. He suggests that we need to 
credit people with certain things in order to make any sense of what they do. Davidson, 
obviously, uses the term in a different context to me. See Essays on Actions and Events, p. 221 
for details. 
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part and stems from the fact that for the most part we are unable to objectively assess the 
rationality of behaviour or the system. If a system's behaviour is such that it realises what we 
perceive its interests to be and there is no obvious constraint on its freedom we assume that 
it is rational. When systems behave in a manner that violates what we understand to be the 
logical course of action given what we assume are their interests our assumption of their 
rationality is called into question. In such a case we rely on the system's introspective 
testimony as to its motives to see whether there is a logical reason for the behaviour. If there 
is such a reason we are content with the ascription of rationality and if not we retract it 
altogether. 
Whether this conception of rationality is viable or not in the sense of whether any system 
is ever able to deliberate and 'move' itself, is beyond the scope of this investigation. It might 
well be that determinism or mechanism are true of all behavioural systems. This does not alter 
the fact that from a folk perspective we think that some systems are capable of method-
dependent rationality. In particular we think that persons are such systems. We may be under 
an illusion on this matter but that does not affect the conclusion that must be drawn from this 
discussion. In some cases we do assume a different sort of rationality to that proposed by 
Dennett. His is the broad method-independent rationality while the folk conception tends to 
be the narrower method-dependent rationality. This would suggest that there are in fact two 
different types of intentional stance. 
5.3 In Summary 
What we have seen in this chapter then, is that Dennett's conception of rationality 
depends ultimately only on a system's behaviour generally satisfYing its interests. Using the 
example of a chess-playing computer I developed a clear model of the conception of 
rationality which Dennett would have us believe is at the heart of our adoption of the 
intentional stance. I called this conception method-independent rationality. I then challenged 
the idea that this is indeed the conception of rationality we rely on when making intentional 
characterisations of systems and their behaviour. The method was to find a case where 
Dennett would have to retain his assumption of rationality and treat the system as an 
intentional system. but where from an ordinary intuitive perspective we would retract both our 
assumption of rationality and the intentional characterisation. Sphex proved to be a perfect 
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example. I then developed the details of this alternative conception of rationality and called 
it method-dependent rationality. The single most important difference between the two 
conceptions of rationality discussed was shown to lie in the fact that method-independent 
rationality is based entirely on the success of behaviour while method-dependent rationality 
is based on the way behaviour comes about. Finally I suggested that it is clear that our 
intuitive conception does differ from Dennett's and that as a result there is a very real sense 
in which we can say that there are two different types of intentional stance. It is to this issue 
which we now tum. 
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6. a Two Intentional Stances 
In the previous section I showed that the intuitive conception of rationality, which I have 
called method-dependent rationality, differs substantially from Dennett's method-independent 
rationality. We further saw that method-dependent rationality is exploited in some instances 
of adopting the intentional perspective toward a system which means that Dennett's assertion 
that we assume what I have called method-independent rationality is not strictly speaking true. 
What is true is that if we adopt the intentional perspective as proposed by Dennett then we 
obviously must employ his conception of rationality. But it is clear that in our normal 
everyday adoption of this perspective we are in fact employing the stricter notion of method-
dependent rationality. I suggested that this state of affairs is such that we must conclude that 
there are two intentional stances, Dennett's and the common sensical or intuitive one. In this 
chapter I am going to examine the two. The basic idea is to show that there is a clear 
difference between the two types of intentional stance. Once this has been achieved it will be 
apparent that although Dennett has made a case for the compatibilism of mechanism and one 
sort of intentional explanation, he has not successfully reconciled the notions of mechanism 
and responsibility. This is because our judgements of responsibility are made from a 
significantly different position to Dennett's intentional stance. 
I begin by detailing what for now I am going to call the folk stance. This is just the 
version of the intentional stance that relies on method-dependent rationality. I show that aside 
from exploiting a different sense of rationality to Dennett's intentional stance, it also demands 
a strong realism about intentional states. I then turn to Dennett's intentional stance and 
suggest that its nature is such that it is better understood as a pseudo-intentional stance. In 
light of this we turn once again to the issue of compatibilism. I show that Dennett has secured 
the case for explanatory compatibilism, but only with regard to mechanistic explanations and 
intentional explanations generated from his pseudo-intentional stance. He has not done the 
same for mechanistic explanations and intentional explanations from the folk stance. I go on 
to show that in fact the folk stance must remain beyond the scope of Dennett's compatibilist 
move. Finally I suggest that it is only from the folk stance that we judge systems to be 
responsible for their behaviour. Given this outcome I conclude that Dennett's attempt to 
secure explanatory compatibilism between intentional explanations and mechanistic 
explanations is not able to make the additional case for the compatibilism of mechanism and 
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responsibility. This is mainly because Dennett's attempt auns at the wrong kind of 
' intentional ' explanation. 
6.1 The Folk Stance 
We have seen that when we normally adopt the intentional perspective towards 
behavioural systems a particular conception of rationality is involved which differs from 
Dennett's conception. This conception of rationality is such that the way in which behaviour 
comes about plays a crucial role and has been called method-dependent rationality. In setting 
out the ideas that lie behind this conception of rationality we saw that there are three basic 
criteria that we would want to be satisfied in order to say that the system is in fact rational. 
Firstly there is the freedom criterion, which requires that it be possible for the system to 
deliberate about what it is going to do. Secondly there is the success criterion which is such 
that we require behaviour to generally fulfil the system's interests.3o Thirdly there is the causal 
criterion that requires that the system not only be aware of the logical dictates of its interests 
but also for the system itself to somehow bring about its behaviour because of this awareness. 
I now wish to investigate what implications, if any, can be drawn from the notion of method-
dependent rationality for the ontological status of intentional states. 
Working with the first criterion it is clear that for a system to be method-dependent 
rational it must actually believe that it is up to it as to what it is going to do. That is, it must 
believe that it is in some sense free to do as it wishes. Clearly this belief cannot be merely a 
matter of interpretation. In order for a system to deliberate at all it must really believe that 
what it does is up to it. That is, there must be some mental event within the system that is a 
belief in its freedom. Merely adopting a perspective where we interpret the system's 
behaviour as involving deliberation will obviously not suffice. This is because an assumption 
of the presence of the belief is simply not enough to enable the system to deliberate. I don't 
want to suggest, however, that this belief must actually be a conscious belief at the time of 
deliberation. In other words I am not suggesting that the system has to be literally aware of its 
belief in its freedom while it deliberates. On the contrary, I suspect that the belief in question 
"Note that this criterion pertains to the broad notion of behaviour. In the narrower case 
of action the criterion is much stronger and requires that the behaviour always satisfies a system's 
interests. See sect 5.2. 
45 
is typically unconscious. But we must note that in the very process of engaging in deliberation 
a system must at the very least tacitly believe that it is free. This would seem to indicate that 
from the fo lk perspective we require a certain realism about belief. 
The idea that the folk stance involves a realist perspective of belief, and indeed all 
intentional states, is further borne out by the causal consideration which features in method-
dependent rationality. We have seen that this criterion requires that a system's interests, that 
is its beliefs and desires, feature in the causal story of its behaviour. Which is to say that a 
system must be aware of the logical implications of its intentional states and its awareness 
thereof must play a role in bringing about the behaviour. This would suggest that the 
intentional states mentioned in the explanation of the behaviour must really exist as events 
that the system itself recognises if we are to say that the system in question is method-
dependent rational. It would not be enough, therefore, to make the existence of intentional 
states simply a matter of theoretical interpretation. Making intentional states such as beliefs 
and desires merely a matter of adopting a particular interpretive stance cannot give them the 
causal power required. The upshot of this discussion is that in effect the causal criterion 
makes it such that not only are we able to provide an intentional explanation of the system's 
behaviour but that we have to provide such an explanation. This is obvious once we realise 
that the intentional elements of the explanation are events that, by definition, must feature in 
the causal history of the behaviour. If they do not feature in the causal history of the behaviour 
then the system would fail the causal criterion for method-dependent rationality and would 
not be counted as an intentional system. 
What we find developing from this discussion is a conception of the intentional stance 
that is based on typical folk attitudes towards the explanation of behaviour. The stance, which 
we can call thefolk stance, is similar to Dennett's intentional stance in that it involves the 
explanation of behaviour based on intentional states and rationality. We have seen though, that 
the conception of rationality involved is markedly different from that exploited in Dennett's 
position. Method-dependent rationality, as I have called it, focuses on the way in which 
behaviour comes about. Because of this a large number of behavioural systems that would 
count as being intentional systems on Dennett's conception are excluded from the group of 
systems so classified on the folk stance. Examples would be some of those we have already 
addressed, such as computers, calculators, Sphex, thermostats, and the insane. The other 
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salient aspect to the folk stance is that it demands a strong realism about intentional states. I 
have already briefly discussed Dennett's position on the ontology of intentional states. I 
showed that Dennett conceives of his position as lying between strong realism and strong 
interpretationism. What I seek to establish now is whether Dennett's position is sufficiently 
realist to be considered compatible with the folk conception outlined above. If it can be shown 
that his position is not really compatible with the folk conception of intentional states then it 
will be clear that despite their superficial resemblance, the two different intentional stances 
are totally distinct positions. 
6.2 Is Dennett's Conception of Intentional States Realist Enough? 
I argued above that if a system is to be classified as an intentional system from the folk 
perspective it must really have intentional states in the sense that they must feature in the 
explanation of the system's behaviour. I called this a strong realist position. What I seek to 
show is that there is an unbridgeable gap between Dennett's intentional stance and the folk 
stance. So the question that needs to be addressed now is whether Dennett's position on the 
existence of intentional states is similar enough to the folk position as to make no difference 
which conception is employed. I hope to show that Dennett's conception is not up to the task. 
This will mean that aside from the difference in conceptions of rationality already established, 
the two stances also differ radically on the matter of the existential status of intentional states. 
If this can be established then it will be clear that the divide between the two stances is 
complete, since both of the crucial elements to the warring explanatory strategies will have 
been shown to be irreconcilable. 
As I indicated above, the crucial element to the realism of intentional states from the folk 
stance lies in the fact that we have to advert to them in explaining the system's behaviour. In 
effect this means that for systems that count as intentional systems on the folk stance, talk of 
their beliefs and desires is strictly ineliminable.31 In comparing Dennett's conception with this 
conception then, the obvious route is to ascertain whether his position does allow for the 
31 By ineliminable I don't, of course, mean that we could not stop using the intentional 
terms. It is clear, for instance, that on an Identity Theory one would be able to eliminate use of 
the words for beliefs and desires but the beliefs and desires themselves, being brain states, could 
not be eliminated. This is the sense in which I mean that they cannot be eliminated. 
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elimination of intentional talk. In other words, we need to see whether Dennett's conception 
of the existential status of beliefs and desires is meaningfully realist or whether the conception 
ultimately collapses into mere dependence on the adoption of a particular interpretive stance. 
Dennett, of course, would want to resist the notion that his commitment to intentional states 
is purely instrumental but if that is what his position finally proves to be it will just be an 
unpalatable fact that he has to accept.32 The idea that intentional talk is basically eliminable 
on Dennett's conception is not new. It has been raised by Nozick and is addressed by Dennett 
in The Intentional Stance. 
Dennett's view, as we have seen, is simply that if a system is reliably and voluminously 
predictable from the intentional stance (an interpretative position) then it really, in the 
strongest sense of the word, has the beliefs attributed to it (Dennett, (1987) p.29). This clearly 
makes Dennett an instrumentalist about belief (Stich, (1990) p.170). He is an instrumentalist 
about belief because he attributes belief to the extent that it makes the intentional stance work. 
As an instrumentalist about belief we easily see the interpretive element of Dennett' s notion 
of belief. Beliefs are discernable in agents' observable behaviour when we choose to interpret 
that behaviour from the intentional stance. Now the question we need to resolve is whether 
this position is, in the final analysis, such that it involves no robust objectivity or realism with 
regard to intentional states. In other words, whether Dennett's conception commits us to the 
existence of intentional states as real events or not. With this in mind let us consider an 
example. 
Imagine that a Martian species were to arrive on earth. These creatures are incredibly 
good physicists, so good in fact, that they can explain our behaviour in its entirety without 
resorting to the intentional stance. They operate toward us on a purely physical, that is, 
mechanistic, level. Where we are faced with two people moving chess pieces on a chequered 
board for instance, they perceive a mass of atomic particles behaving in strict accord with the 
laws of physics. Utilising these rules they are able to say many moves in advance, in fact 
before the game begins, exactly who will win, and how that person will do so. With regard 
to our behaviour they have absolute success in predicting what we will do and in explaining 
32For Dennett's thoughts on this matter see his troubled statements to this effect in 
Dennett and his Critics, p. 210. 
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why we did what we did. What the example presumes to show is that the use of the intentional 
stance is simply a matter of interpretation; if Martians can abandon it with absolute success 
then the intentional idiom does not occupy a special objective place in the world. Of course 
the example assumes that we are in fact mechanistic in nature. On this assumption we would 
obviously be excluded from the group of intentional systems as delineated from the folk 
stance. But whether it is true that we are mechanisms of this sort or not the point is still made 
- when a mechanistic explanation is available we do not have to retain the intentional 
perspective. 
Dennett has a response to this objection and it provides us with the essential clue as to his 
'realism' about the intentional idioms. Dennett suggests that if these Martians engaged in a 
predicting contest of human behaviour with a human they would be amazed at the success of 
the human, in fact the humans performance would seem magical to them. Why? Simply 
because that by operating at the physical level they miss a perfectly objective pattern - that 
picked out by the intentional stance. This is meant to show us that the beliefs assumed in the 
intentional stance are objective, real things (Dennett, (1987) pp.25-28). But does it? What is 
the ontological status of patterns or their elements? For our purposes it is critical to uncover 
the essence of Dennett's claim that the intentional pattern and its attendant elements (eg. 
beliefs, desires, rationality etc.) are perfectly objective. It seems that Dennett is saying that 
intentional states are real because where there are intelligent beings the relevant behavioural 
patterns are there to be described whether we care to see them or not. But what kind of 
existence can we grant to a pattern? 
To answer a question such as that posed it would be wise to first establish exactly what 
we are talking about. What, then, is a pattern? This complex topic has been tackled by Dennett 
in his influential and ground-breaking article, "Real Patterns". 33 According to Dennett a 
pattern is a candidate for pattern recognition. But this has the air of tautology about it. When 
is something a candidate of the aforementioned sort? The standard answer appears to be that 
something is a candidate for pattern recognition if there is some way to transmit all the 
information needed to replicate that thing without having to transmit the bitmap, that is 
without having to transmit the information bit by bit. In the jargon of pattern-talk we say that 
33See Journal of Philosophy, (1991) 88, pp. 27-51. 
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a pattern exists if there is an algorithm which describes it. An algorithm is simply a formula 
that compresses the information. So, for example, the set of even numbers from zero to 
infinity is a pattern. Why? Because we can transmit all the information needed to replicate the 
set (which consists of an infinite number of separate bits of information) in a mere nine words, 
that is "the set of even numbers from zero to infinity". The phrase "the set of even numbers 
from zero to infinity" is one algorithm that describes the pattern expressed by 0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 
12, 14, 16, 18 etc. Now a pattern need not be as neatly expressible as this in order for it to 
exist, all that is required is that it be possible to transmit all the information using less bits 
than the pattern itself occupies. So the number string "0, 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, ... infinity" is also a 
pattern only its algorithm is "the set of even numbers from zero to infmity including 1 and 7". 
The two odd numbers in this example are called noise. If the noise gets so dense as to render 
it impossible to transmit the required information in less than the bitmap then the pattern 
ceases to exist. 
To illustrate his position with regard to intentional states Dennett draws an analogy with 
John Horton Conway's Game of Life (Dennett, (l991b) p.37 ft). Life is played on a 
theoretically infinite two dimensional grid. The grid divides the area into cells which at any 
point in time might be alive or dead. Live cells are filled, while dead ones are left blank. Each 
cell has eight neighbours. Time advances in ticks in the game. The population of the Life 
world changes from moment to moment according to the following basic rule: Each cell 
determines the state of its neighbours. If only two neighbours are alive that cell will remain 
in its current state for the next time slice. If three neighbours are alive the cell will also be 
alive in the next instant. In all other cases the cell will be dead for the next instant. Now, as 
Dennett points out, if we apply this rule scrupulously we can predict with perfect accuracy 
exactly what is going to happen on Life in the next instant, and the instant after that, and the 
one after that... and so on. By applying the rule we latch onto the physics of Life and are able 
to utilise an algorithm for prediction. This is analogous to adopting the physical stance. The 
example shows us that where mechanism is true the physical stance yields perfect predictions. 
Taking a step back from the trees as it were we soon discover that sometimes the cells form 
configurations that are interesting. Some configurations swim across the grid, others eat any 
configuration that they come into contact with, and yet others give birth to various swimming 
configurations. Naturally these come to be named and we suddenly find Life populated by 
so 
gliders, ships, eaters, glider-guns, and puffers. (See figures overleaf) These 'entities' behave 
in a consistent way. They persist through time. Where before there was only a grid of either 
alive or dead cells there is now a veritable zoo of recognisable entities. Viewing Life from this 
level is analogous to adopting the intentional stance, or so Dennett wishes to suggest. 
The question Dennett would have us answer is whether there really are gliders or whether 
there are just cells forming patterns that behave as if they were gliders (Dennett, (1991 b) 
p.39).It is clear that in the example of Life there are just two different 'translation manuals' 
for what is going on. One manual tells us about individual cells - it generates perfect 
predictions of the future on Life. The other manual tells us about persisting entities - it 
generates very good predictions provided there is no noise. Ascending to the level of 
persisting entities carries some risk, it is not perfect after all, but also carries major benefits 
especially in the realm of computing time and complexity. Dennett suggests that the patterns 
are there for the picking up and will be if the right algorithm is hit upon. Basically he runs the 
Quinian line that when you have radical translation there is no fact of the matter between two 
translation manuals as to which is the right one - the so-called indeterminacy of translation. 34 
As Quine would have it not only is there no fact of the matter but asking the question itself 
makes no sense because there is no conceivable way oftelling which is the right translation. 
Dennett's position on intentional states is that they are just elements of one among many 
translation manuals of human behaviour. It makes no sense to ask whether beliefs (or gliders) 
really exist, or analogously whether the intentional stance is the correct explanation of reality. 
Our ontological commitment to these entities depends on the way they function as terms in 
our language. Beliefs cannot playas wide a role as material objects can and so we are less 
committed to them than we are to the material world. But just because we are less committed 
to beliefs than we are to material things it does not mean that beliefs do not exist or are not 
objectively there. 
34Quine uses the following example. An anthropologist is translating a native's language. 
The native utters the sentence "Gavagai" as a rabbit hops past. Now the anthropologist translates 
the sentence as "rabbit", or "10 a rabbit". But Quine points out that 'gavagai' may refer to rabbit 
body parts, or time segments of rabbit, or fluffy white animal equally plausibly. He provides a 
long discussion of this in Word and Object, but the gist needed to understand my point here can 
be found at pp. 51-4. 
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Figure 1: A Glider takes five ticks to advance itself by one space 
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Figure 2: An Eater consumes a Glider as the Glider touches it 
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Figure 3: A Ship slowly makes its way across the grid 
Note that we can choose to adopt a perspective where there are Gliders, Eaters, and Ships in Life. We 
can also adopt a perspective where, by applying a simple algorithm, cells are merely either on or off 
depending on their previous state and of that of their surrounding cells. Adopting such a perspective 
allows us to predict exactly what the next state will be. (Graphics generated on PageMaker from 
WinLife by John Harper) 
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What is abundantly clear from this elucidation of Dennett's position is that for him 
intentional talk is not really eliminable. When we are faced with a mechanistic system we can 
explain its behaviour in at least two ways, depending on what translation manual we are using. 
So the fact that there is a mechanistic explanation does not mean that beliefs and desires cease 
to exist. Of course, it is clear that in such a case we do not have to use intentional jargon to 
explain the behaviour of the system, so it is eliminable in a sense. But because of the Quinian 
notion that there is no fact of the matter as to which way something is to be translated, the 
intentional translation cannot be rejected altogether. It is as legitimate as the mechanistic one. 
Basically Dennett's position is one where whether we use a mechanistic explanation or an 
intentional one is a matter of at which joints we choose to carve nature. The idea is something 
like the notion that mechanistic explanations carve digit by digit, while intentional 
explanations take a limb at a time. Now, since intentional states on Dennett's account do 
obviously occupy some sort of objective position and are not totally eliminable the question 
remains as to whether there is a real difference between Dennett' s conception of the 
intentional states and the folk conception. 
The grounds of an answer to our question have already been laid. We have seen that the 
realism of the folk conception of intentional states is grounded in the fact that on that 
conception we have to advert to such states in order to explain the actions of an intentional 
system. In other words, from the folk perspective we are never faced with a case of 
indeterminacy of translation. If there is a mechanistic explanation of a system's behaviour 
then we must use the mechanistic translation manual. If, on the other hand, there has to be an 
intentional explanation of the system's behaviour then that is the translation manual we must 
use. So on the folk conception there is a fact of the matter as to how to interpret behaviour. 
This perspective can be contrasted with what we have seen regarding Dennett's position. 
Namely that we do not have to employ intentional terms to explain behaviour on Dennett's 
account. Furthermore it is apparent that although intentional states can be said to exist on 
Dennett's conception, they really depend for their existence on our adopting a particular 
interpretive stance toward behavioural systems. Pushing the contrast to its limit, we see that 
in a plausible sense the intentional systems as picked out be the folk stance can be said to 
really believe and desire while those of Dennett's intentional stance would be better 
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characterised as merely behaving as if they believe and desire. Given this outcome I propose 
that we think of the folk stance as being an intentional stance proper, and that Dennett's 
intentional stance is better understood as a pseudo-intentional stance. 
6.3 Explanatory Compatibilism Again 
The notion of explanatory compatibilism, we have seen, is that mechanistic and 
intentional explanations of a system's behaviour can coexist. Now that we have a deeply 
enriched understanding of Dennett' s attempt to secure such a position it is clear that his sort 
of intentional explanation is indeed compatible with mechanistic explanation. This outcome 
is not, after all, surprising in the least, since Dennett standardly employs examples of known 
mechanisms to illustrate his intentional stance. What we have also seen, however, is that 
Dennett's sort of intentional explanation is not the only sort of intentional explanation. The 
alternative conception, called the folk stance, is one which truly has action as opposed to mere 
behaviour at its heart. In essence it focuses on a much narrower sphere of behaviour than 
Dennett's stance does. It only pertains to behaviour that is brought about because of a certain 
set of intentional states and which the system, or agent, wills. The question that remains is 
whether Dennett's move could possibly extended to this alternative. 
I want to suggest that the preceding discussions of method-dependent rationality and the 
folk conception of intentional states have shown beyond all doubt that Dennett' s 
compatibilism does not, and cannot, extend to include intentional explanation from the folk 
stance. We have seen that the folk idea of rationality is such that it explicitly excludes systems 
whose behaviour can be mechanistically explained from being rational. This in itself is enough 
to show that Dennett's cornpatibilism could not include folk intentional explanations. His 
compatibilism is, after all, at least partly generated from a conception of rationality that is 
specifically tailored to include mere mechanisms. That conception of rationality, method-
independent rationality, is purely a matter of external assessment of whether a system's 
behaviour fits with its putative beliefs and desires. But the case against extending Dennett's 
compatibilism can be made even stronger. 
It has been established that a further element to Dennett's compatibilism lies in his 
understanding of what intentional states actually are. In other words, his compatibilist position 
is also legitimated in part by his understanding of the existential status ofthe things designated 
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by the terms which populate intentional explanations in general. His understanding, we have 
seen, is one where notions such as belief and desire depend for their existence mainly on their 
being elements to a pattern which we discern when we adopt his intentional stance. The fact 
is, however, that this conception ultimately makes intentional states merely a matter of 
interpretation and consequently makes Dennett's position one of straight instrumentalism. I 
have called these pseudo-intentional states because of the lack of a robust realism associated 
with them. Now it is obvious that this conception can be extended to include real (as opposed 
to pseudo) intentional states and so it may seem that Dennett's conception is not in any 
difficulty. But the folk understanding of intentional states with its attendant realist perspective 
is such that these intentional states must feature in the causal story behind the system's 
behaviour. In fact, this element of the folk conception is a major factor in the realism of the 
position. Now Dennett's pseudo-intentional states clearly do not occupy the same status. 
Pseudo-intentional states do not have to feature in the causal story of a system' s behaviour.35 
This consideration would suggest that the two conceptions of intentional states are actually 
vastly different and that Dennett's pseudo-intentional stance must remain forever apart from 
the folk stance. As a consequence of this unbridgeable divide between the two positions it 
follows that even though Dennett has shown his kind of intentional explanation to be 
compatible with mechanistic explanation he has not made the case for the folk intentional 
explanation. With this conclusion firmly in mind we can now return to the issue of moral 
responsibility . 
6.4 Two Intentional Stances and the issue of Moral Responsibility 
Earlier on I discussed the conditions surrounding our typical ascriptions of moral praise 
and blame. What I wish to investigate now is which of the two 'intentional stances' is best 
suited to our judgements of moral responsibility. My claim will be that Dennett's position is 
in fact ill-suited to judgements of moral responsibility and that the folk perspective fares much 
better. Putting this together with the case I have already established for saying that Dennett's 
compatibilism does not extend to the folk stance I suggest that Dennett is unable to secure the 
35There is one exception to this of course. When the system is not a mechanistic one the 
pseudo-intentional states are ultimately the system's real intentional states. In such a case, 
obviously, a mechanistic explanation would not be available and the intentional explanation 
would be the only explanation. 
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compatibilism of mechanism and responsibility. The argument is simple and decisive. If our 
judgements of moral responsibility are made from the folk stance and they are not made from 
Dennett' s 'pseudo-intentional stance', then Dennett is unable to secure the case for the 
compatibilism of mechanism and responsibility. Our judgements of moral responsibility are 
made from the folk stance and not from Dennett's position. Therefore Dennett cannot, and has 
not, secured the case for the compatibilism of mechanism and responsibility. Basically I plan 
to begin with a brief recapitulation of what is involved in our judgements of moral 
responsibility. I then show that the folk stance captures the sense of what is involved very 
neatly. Finally I show that Dennett's position does not achieve this. 
The notion of responsibility only really becomes an issue when we believe that we are 
faced with a system that is an agent. As long as we do not believe a system to be an agent we 
do not ascribe responsibility in any but the most tenuous sense. So, for example, we might say 
that the wind is responsible for the roof damage, but we would only mean that the thing which 
caused the roof to become damaged was the wind. We would not mean that the wind did the 
roof damaging in the sense of action. Recall, for a further example, our discussion of 
Josephine's breaking the Ming vase because of an epileptic seizure. She was not judged 
responsible because she did not act. What, then, is involved in the notion of agency? A major 
consideration is that for a system to be considered an agent it must be such that we have to 
give and intentional explanation of its behaviour if we are to explain its behaviour at all. That 
is, if a system is to be regarded as an agent we must believe that its intentional states actually 
playa role in the causal factors of its behaviour. 
A second element to our ascription of responsibility lies in the idea that we tend not to 
ascribe responsibility unless we believe that the system believes that it had some choice in the 
matter of what it was going to do. If, for example, we believe that the system did what it did 
because it believed that it could not have done otherwise we would generally not assign 
responsibility. So when a system believes that it is coerced, or is perceived to believe that it 
has been unable to refrain from doing what it did, or when there is seen to be any force 
majeure propelling behaviour forward, we do not hold the system responsible. This point is 
highlighted if we consider an example. It may seem that responsibility is judged on what is 
and is not simply a matter of what the subject believes, but this is wrong. Consider that when 
I ask you why you did not turn off the stove and you reply that it was because you did not 
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believe that it was on, I cannot hold you responsible for your lack of action. I might hold you 
responsible for your belief if, say, I told you that it was on, but that is now a different issue 
and does not pertain to your behaviour. So we see that when this element is not satisfied we 
do not ascribe responsibility. Except, of course, in the tenuous sense expressed above where 
the wind was responsible for damage. This sense is most certainly not that of moral 
responsibility. Linked to this element of our responsibility judgements is the notion that we 
can only judge responsibility when the cause of a system' s behaviour lies in the reasons it has 
for behaving and not some chain of antecedent physical events. The reason we have this 
notion is that when we judge responsibility we are ultimately claiming to have identified the 
culprit responsible for a certain set of circumstances. When behaviour is caused by a set of 
antecedent physical events we cannot legitimately lay claim to have identified the perpetrator 
of the behaviour if we halt our search only at the level of the system itself. In fact the 
ascription of responsibility in such a case is, I have suggested, merely a case of settling on a 
scapegoat and is an arbitrary affair. 
The question before us now is whether the folk stance is suited to the notion of ascribing 
responsibility or not. I believe that the case for claiming that it is has already been made 
perfectly clear. We have seen that the folk stance is such that it aims specifically at 
behavioural systems which are considered to be agents. These systems are such that we have 
to provide an intentional explanation of their behaviour if we are to explain it at all. In 
adopting the folk stance, furthermore, we ascribe a particular conception of rationality wherein 
the system' s belief that what it does is up to it plays a major role. Finally we have seen that 
thefblk stance involves a conception of the origin of behaviour which places the cause of the 
behaviour with the system itself rather than with some chain of antecedent physical events. 
This shows clearly that the folk stance is particularly well suited to the ascription of 
responsibility . 
Now, is Dennett' s intentional stance up to the task? Can it be said to be suited to the 
ascription of moral praise and blame? Once again I believe that the answer has already been 
clearly detailed in our preceding discussion. Dennett' s position has been shown to be such that 
we most certainly do not have to employ intentional explanations of intentional systems in 
general. It is also such that choice does not feature at all. A system does not have to believe 
that what it does is up to it in order to qualifY as an intentional system for Dennett. Finally 
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Dennett's stance explicitly caters for systems whose behaviour is mechanistically caused and 
which thus does not originate with the system itself. These show that Dennett's position is 
obviously not well suited to judgements of responsibility. This conclusion is further bolstered 
by the fact that fustly we have seen that the folk stance is well suited to judgements of this 
kind and secondly by the fact that we have seen that there is an unbridgeable gap between the 
two stances. 
It should be perfectly clear now that Dennett's intentional stance is not the position from 
which we judge responsibility. Furthermore it is particularly ill-suited to being thought of as 
such a position. Now the fact that Dennett has made a case for the compatibilism of his kind 
of intentional explanation and mechanistic explanation can be seen to have no impact on the 
question of mechanism and responsibility. Dennett's case does not extend to include the folk 
stance and it is from the folk stance that we actually make our judgements of moral 
responsibility. The upshot is then, that Dennett fails to reconcile mechanism and 
responsibility. The main reason for this lies in the fact that his attempt literally misses the 
mark in that it focuses on the wrong sort of intentional explanation. 
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7.0 Concluding remarks 
The time has come to take stock. I have covered a lot of ground and now wish to 
consolidate the process by providing a brief overview of the argument as it was developed. 
In essence I am now going to give a step by step run through the investigation highlighting 
salient issues and tying off any loose ends. 
The first step was to basically draw out the intuitions regarding moral responsibility. At 
that stage we saw that there is a strong intuition that the ascription of responsibility is only 
legitimate when we have to give an intentional explanation of the behaviour. I went on to 
show that there is a further intuition that intentional explanations are undermined by 
mechanistic explanations. We saw that there appears to be a strong prima Jacie case to this 
effect. One way that the resultant explanatory incompatibilism could be avoided, I suggested, 
would be to adopt a form of reductive materialism. This move would identify intentional 
states with brain states and thus effectively rule out the issue of incompatibilism. This, of 
course, is not the route that Dennett takes and so we turned to examine that. From Dennett's 
perspective we saw that there seemed to be an equally plausible case Jor compatibilism. He 
systematically depicts mechanistic systems from an intentional perspective and no violence 
seems to be done to the intentional characterisation by the fact that the systems are quite 
obviously mere mechanisms. What this showed however, was only that mechanistic behaviour 
can be intentionally characterised and not that intentional behaviour can be mechanistically 
explained. This is obviously the other half of the battle in reconciling the two vying 
explanatory strategies. 
With this in mind we found that Dennett develops a conception of intentional 
explanations that includes a specific understanding of what rationality is, and what ontological 
status is to be assigned to the intentional states. The rationale behind this move on Dennett's 
part is obvious. What he seeks to show is that behaviour that counts as intentional in this 
account is not committed to the truth or otherwise of mechanism. Basically the move seeks 
to show that there is no reason why intentional behaviour cannot be mechanistically explained. 
The place to look for shortcomings in Dennett' s account clearly lay in this very broad method-
independent rationality he uses and, of course, his position on intentional states. I argued that 
method-independent rationality just does not do justice to our requirements regarding action 
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and agency. I showed that there is a different sort of rationality, method-dependent rationality, 
involved in our understanding of agency and that it is vastly different to Dennett' s. This, I 
claimed, is indicative of the idea that there are in fact two different sorts of intentional stance 
and thus two different types of intentional explanation. It also means that Dennett only secures 
a compatibilism for one of the types. 
To bolster the case against Dennett I turned to the issue of intentional states. That is, I set 
about showing that aside from the two different understandings of rationality employed in the 
two stances, there are other irreconcilable differences between the two. I showed that 
Dennett's intentional stance really defends a conception of intentional states that is 
interpretationist or instrumentalist while the alternative, which I called the folk stance, 
demands a strong realism. I went on to indicate that it is actually from the folk stance that we 
make our judgments of responsibility. Beside the fact that the folk stance excludes the 
possibility of mechanistic systems being truly characterised as intentional systems by its very 
nature, I suggested that seeing as Dennett clearly reconciles the non-relevant type of 
intentional explanation, namely his own, with mechanism he ultimately fails to reconcile 
mechanism and responsibility. 
In the final analysis then we see that Dennett's intentional stance is better characterised 
as a pseudo-intentional stance. It exploits a conception of rationality that is so broad that it 
enables all sorts of systems to qualify as intentional systems, many of which we would not 
count as intentional systems from the folk perspective. The conception of intentional states 
that goes with Dennett's stance has also been found wanting. It is clear that Dennett does 
secure explanatory compatibilism between his type of intentional explanation and mechanistic 
explanation but he has not gone far enough. In particular he has been unable to reconcile 
genuine intentional explanations with mechanistic ones. In fact it seems unlikely that this is 
even possible. As such we see that Dennett has failed to allay our fears for the notions of 
moral responsibility and intentional explanation in the face of popular belief in the idea that 
we will eventually uncover the mechanistic nature of our behaviour. I am not persuaded by 
this idea and hope to see a coherent and plausible conception of agent-causation developed 
that secures the matter of our agency and the possibility of our being held morally responsible 
for what we do. This, however, is a major undertaking and must, for now, remain a possibility 
for future consideration. 
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